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I. INTRODUCTION
Holders of public debt securities often face a dilemma when a trou-
bled company presents them with a restructuring proposal seeking
payment and other concessions. If the proposal is structured as an
exchange offer, these bondholders must choose either to accept the
terms of the new securities offered in the exchange or to "hold out"
of the offer and suffer loss of payment priority, security and covenant
protections through punitive "exit" amendments to the securities
they hold. In the past several years, bondholders have responded to
such exchange offers by organizing themselves and forming unoffi-
cial bondholder committees. By unifying a group of bondholders
large enough to block such an exchange, bondholder committees
have generally neutralized the coercive aspects of exchange offers by
forcing issuers to negotiate and reach agreement with them before
obtaining the needed financial relief.
However, this procedure has several weaknesses. First, unofficial
bondholder committees have no official status or authority. It is
often unclear (both to the committee and the issuer) how many
bondholders such a committee actually represents and even less clear
whether the bondholders it claims to represent will honor the com-
mittee's commitments. Thus, while unofficial committees provide a
sounding board for bondholder concerns and a procedural mechanism
for negotiating the terms of a restructuring, the mechanism is prob-
lematic: neither the committee nor the issuer can be entirely sure
that the negotiations, even if successful, will yield an agreement that
will be accepted by enough bondholders to consummate the ex-
change.1 Moreover, even if enough bondholders are inclined to
make the financial concessions necessary to provide the issuer with
the overall relief it needs, the agreement may still fail because of
bondholders' visceral unwillingness to allow their concessions to ben-
efit opportunistic holdouts seeking to profit at the expense of the ma-
jority. In the past, unofficial committees have sought to solve the
holdout problem by insisting that the issuer implement the restruc-
turing through a "prepackaged" Chapter 11 plan of reorganization,2
which, unlike an out-of-court exchange offer, binds all holders to a
plan approved by holders representing sixty-six and two-thirds per-
cent in amount of claims and fifty percent in number of creditors in
any class of creditors.3
In this article, we suggest that, in certain cases, the filing of a fed-
eral class action lawsuit by bondholders and the effectuation of a con-
sensual restructuring through the settlement of the action may
provide substantial benefits over the prepackaged plan approach de-
scribed above. Under the class action approach, representatives of
the bondholders would file a lawsuit against the issuer of the bonds
following a payment or other default, or in response to a restructur-
ing proposal made by the issuer. Such representatives would then
seek to have the lawsuit certified by the court as a mandatory class
action-that is, an action binding upon all members of the class, with
no right to opt out. These representatives, who would then officially
represent the entire class of bondholders in the certified class action,
would negotiate a settlement of the lawsuit that provides for a re-
structuring of the securities. The restructuring settlement, once ap-
proved by the court after a fairness hearing, would bind all members
of the bondholder class.
While mandatory class action lawsuits have been used rarely in re-
cent years to effectuate binding corporate restructurings, 4 we believe
1. For example, in its October 4, 1990 exchange offers, The Southland Corpora-
tion failed to obtain the requisite acceptance levels from four out of six issues of secur-
ities even though the terms of the exchange had been agreed to by the informal
committees. See Memorandum Opinion Invalidating Acceptance of Pre-Packaged Plan
of Reorganization at 17, In re Southland Corp., No. 390-37119-HCA-11 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1990).
2. In Southland, it was the bondholder steering committee-not the issuer-that
"suggested a prepackaged plan of reorganization as one way to insure participation by
an acceptably high percentage of holders." See Memorandum of The Southland Corpo-
ration (1) In Support of Confirmation of its Prepackaged Plan of Reorganization and
(2) In Response to Objections to Confirmation at 15, In re Southland Corp., No. 390-
37119-HCA-11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 1990).
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1988) (the "Bankruptcy Code").
4. See MBank Dallas v. LaBarge, Inc., No. 86 C 9583 (N.D. Ill. December 29, 1986)
(unpublished findings of fact, conclusions of law and final order) and Kemper Inves-
tors Life Ins. Co. v. Las Colinas Corp., No. 88 C 9162 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 1989) (unpub-
lished final order). See also infra Sections II(A) and IV(B), which discuss the LaBarge
and Colinas cases. In Las Colinas, the issuer was able to avoid filing a prepackaged
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that this approach has a number of advantages over the prepackaged
plan approach. First, the issuer and the representatives of a certified
class action can negotiate the terms of a restructuring with the assur-
ance that the class representatives officially represent the class and
have the ability to propose a settlement that, when approved by the
court after a fairness hearing, will bind all members of the bond-
holder class. Second, the restructuring can occur without resort to
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which may impose significant
costs and may present unacceptable risks for both the bondholders
and the issuer.
Indeed, the filing for relief under Chapter 11, even briefly to effec-
tuate a prepackaged plan, may damage an issuer's business and repu-
tation and jeopardize its supplier and vendor relationships.
Moreover, the filing of a Chapter 11 petition invites to the table an-
other party-a bankruptcy judge vested with extraordinary powers
under the Bankruptcy Code and with an agenda that sometimes fa-
vors the interests of third parties over the interests of creditholders
and shareholders.5 As the bondholders in the Eastern Airlines, LTV
and numerous other Chapter 11 cases have learned,6 and as recent
scholarship has demonstrated, restructuring under Chapter 11 can be
be costly for bondholders.7 Since the authority of a federal court to
approve a class action settlement under Rule 23 is limited to consid-
plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 through the settlement of a mandatory class
action lawsuit initiated by one of the bondholders. Las Colinas, No. 88 C 9162, at 1.
5. In the Chapter 11 case of Eastern Airlines, 134 B.R. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (mem-
orandum decision), Judge Lifland "expressed strong feelings that, given the nature of
Eastern's business, it shouldn't just look to the preference of creditors but also to the
public interest, which is to give consumers a choice of airlines." WALL ST. J., Dec. 6,
1990, at C1 (emphasis added). For a criticism of the Eastern Airlines case, see Aaron
Bernstein et al., Eastern: On the Wings of Greed, Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1991, at 34 (noting
that "Early in the bankruptcy, the judge said that getting Eastern flying again was in
the 'public interest' and outweighed the 'parochial' concerns of other parties.").
6. See Aaron Bernstein et al., Eastern: On the Wings of Greed, Bus. WK., Nov. 11,
1991, at 34 (stating that "While this last-gasp step [Chapter 7 liquidation] might help a
little, it probably won't prevent Eastern from ending up as one of the few large bank-
ruptcies in history that won't even have enough money left to pay off the lawyers. If
that happens, unsecured creditors won't get a penny of the $2.2 billion they're owed.").
See also WALL ST. J., April 16, 1991, at Cl (stating that "LTV Corp. said it expects to
file its first reorganization plan by May 6, setting the stage for negotiations that will
allow the company to emerge from bankruptcy court protection."). LTV filed for pro-
tection under Chapter 11 on July 16, 1986. The market price of LTV's 15% Senior
Notes, which traded at $93 just prior to the bankruptcy filing, have not paid interest
for five years and traded at between $12 5/8 and $17 3/8 in 1992. STANDARD & POOR'S
BOND GUIDE 113 (May 1992).
7. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzwieg, The Untenable Case for Chapter
11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1049 (1992) ("In sum, our empirical results indicate that both
eration of the specific action before it, we believe that a federal court
is more likely to effectuate the agreement between the bondholders
and the issuer than is a bankruptcy court under Chapter 11.
Finally, a restructuring implemented through settlement of a class
action lawsuit may be accomplished without registration with the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission through use of the exemption
provided by Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of 1933,8 which pro-
vides an exemption for the issuance of securities whose terms and
conditions have been approved by a court after a fairness hearing.9
This may be a significant advantage to bondholders. One commenta-
tor has stated: "The registration process is time-consuming, particu-
larly in the context of a troubled situation. In that environment,
time is frequently a matter of great concern, but the nature of a trou-
bled enterprise is such that the SEC staff is, understandably, likely to
require a detailed review which extends the duration of the
process."10
In a restructuring, investors are directly harmed by delays caused
by SEC review and bankruptcy proceedings. New investors are par-
ticularly wary of purchasing distressed securities where there is a
possibility of significant delays in the completion of the restructur-
ing.1 1 The uncertainty regarding the outcome and timing of a re-
structuring generally causes securities to trade at depressed levels,
severely impairing the liquidity of the investment. Since the parties
to a class action determine, to a large extent, the terms and timing of
the settlement and need only federal court approval of the settle-
ment, 12 the mandatory class action approach should offer bondhold-
ers timing advantages over the prepackaged plan approach, which
stockholders and bondholders of bankrupt firms suffer dramatically greater losses
under the 1978 Act than previously.").
8. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1988). However, if
debt securities are issued in a class action settlement that is exempt from Securities
Act registration because of the Section 3(a)(10) exemption, the indenture governing
such securities must be qualified with the SEC under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (1988). See infra Section VI.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1988).
10. Simon M. Lorne, Securities and Securities Law Issues in Troubled Debt Situa-
tions in High-Yield Bonds, Leveraged Buyouts, and Troubled Debt Financing, 619, 630-
31 (1989).
11. See, e.g., Martin D. Sass, Distressed Opportunities Plentiful in the 90's, PEN-
SIONS & INVESTMENTS, March 5, 1990, at 1 (explaining that, "For example, after a
mechanical evaluation, a distressed security might appear to have a gross return of
40%. But a review of the dynamics might reveal it will take two years for the return
to be realized, thus significantly reducing the annualized return.")
12. Restructurings accomplished through the settlement of mandatory class action
lawsuits have been completed very quickly. See MBank Dallas v. LaBarge, Inc., No. 86
C 9583 (N.D. Ill. December 29, 1986) (unpublished findings of fact, conclusions of law
and final order) (22 days from filing of complaint to entry of final settlement order).
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generally requires both preapproval by the SEC and subsequent plan
confirmation by a bankruptcy court.
II. COMPARISON OF THE MANDATORY CLASS ACTION APPROACH TO
THE PREPACKAGED PLAN APPROACH
A. Description of the Mandatory Class Action Approach
1. Background
During the early part of this century, many railroads and other in-
terstate corporations were fully reorganized in the federal courts of
the United States through the use of equity receiverships without
any resort to the federal bankruptcy laws. In many such reorganiza-
tions, federal courts used their inherent equitable powers to effectu-
ate reorganizations that were binding upon nonassenting
bondholders.13
The equitable remedy that served as the basis for such equitable
reorganizations--the bill of peace-also served as the basis for the
adoption, in 1938, of the predecessor provisions to the current Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that provide for mandatory
class action lawsuits.14 The Supreme Court has stated: "The class
suit was an invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree in
suits where the number of those interested in the subject of the liti-
gation is so great that their joinder as parties in conformity to the
usual rules of procedure is impracticable." 15
The class action lawsuit is a particularly appropriate procedural ve-
hicle for bondholder action. Because the rights of bondholders of a
particular issue are defined by a single instrument and governed by
the same laws, and because bondholders may be so numerous as to
make it impracticable to join them all in a traditional proceeding, the
class action suit has been used on many occasions, both prior to and
following the promulgation of Rule 23, as a procedure for resolving
conflicts between bondholders and issuers.16
13. See infra Section IV(C).
14. Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multi-
state Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 39 (1986)
(stating that "Mandatory classes find historical precedent in the equitable bill of
peace").
15. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940).
16. See infra Section III(A).
2. Mandatory Class Actions by Bondholders
Class actions by bondholders seeking to implement a restructuring
of their debt securities are generally categorized as actions under
Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2)-the Rule 23 class action classifications that
provide for certifications of mandatory classes with no right to opt
out.17 Bondholders seeking to use a Rule 23 class action lawsuit as a
restructuring technique may coamnence the class action at various
times in the restructuring process. In Continental Assurance Co. v.
MacLeod-Stedman, Inc. 18 and in MBank Dallas v. LaBarge, Inc.,19 the
bondholder representatives filed the class action lawsuits after reach-
ing an agreement with the issuer and before any public offer from
the issuer 2 0-therefore permitting the issuer to avoid the delay and
expense of filing a registration statement with the SEC. On the
other hand, in Las Colinas, one of the bondholders filed the class ac-
tion complaint shortly after the filing with the SEC of a registration
statement for a registered exchange offer and prepackaged plan solic-
itation.21 Although the issuer proceeded with the exchange offer and
the prepackaged plan solicitation, the issuer eventually relied upon
the settlement of the mandatory class action as a procedure for mak-
ing the exchange offer binding upon all bondholders without the use
of the prepackaged plan under Chapter 11.22
After the filing of a Rule 23 class action lawsuit, Rule 23(c)(1) re-
quires the court to hold a hearing to determine whether the class ac-
tion may be maintained. Among issues typically considered at such
hearings are the adequacy of representative plaintiffs to represent
the interests of the class, the scope and definition of the plaintiff
class and the nature of any notice that will be required to be given.23
In addition, Rule 23(c)(4) provides that, when appropriate, a class
may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class.24
Such subclasses would be particularly appropriate in a restructuring
which includes several different issues of debt or other securities of a
single issuer. While there is benefit in having all of the claims re-
solved in a single proceeding, the different issues of securities may
17. See infra Sections III(C), (D) and (E).
18. 694 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
19. No. 86 C 9583 (N.D. Ill. December 29, 1986) (unpublished findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and final order).
20. Id. at 6 (the terms of the tentative settlement were described in a term sheet
attached to the complaint); see also 694 F. Supp. at 453-54.
21. Las Colinas Corporation filed its Registration Statement on Form S-4 (No. 33-
24488) with the SEC on October 4, 1988. The class action lawsuit was filed on October
27, 1988. See Kemper Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Las Colinas Corp., No. 88 C 9162 (N.D.
Ill. 1988) (complaint).
22. See Las Colinas, No. 88 C 9162 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 1989) (unpublished final
order).
23. See infra Section III(A).
24. FED. R. CIv. PROC. 23(c)(4).
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have different contractual rights that will require separate class rep-
resentatives and different settlements. The settlement of the class
action will incorporate the terms of the restructuring. In Continental
Assurance, for example, the settlement agreement provided for the
issuance of $18 million of increasing rate Restructure Notes and $12
million of exchangeable preferred stock in exchange for the existing
$30 million of mortgage notes.25 In Las Colinas, the settlement
agreement provided for the receipt, at the holder's option, of either
new "Adjustable Rate Conduit Mortgage 'Pass Through' Certificates"
or cash (at a discount to principal) in exchange for the issuer's out-
standing twelve and a half percent First Mortgage Notes.26
Rule 23(e) requires court approval for all compromises of Rule 23
class action lawsuits, 27 and Section 3(a)(10) requires that the court
conduct a fairness hearing in order to provide for the Section 3(a)(10)
exemption from SEC registration.28
3. Dissident Strategy: The Threat of an Involuntary Petition
As discussed above, in an out-of-court restructuring, bondholders
often have a significant financial incentive to try to hold out of the
issuer's offer. A successful holdout retains its bonds with their origi-
nal payment terms. Moreover, the holdout's prospects for payment
may have been. enhanced by the financial concessions made by the
other bondholders who participated in the restructuring. On the
other hand, since the settlement of a mandatory class action lawsuit
binds all class members, there are fewer incentives for such dissident
strategies in restructurings effected through mandatory class action
lawsuits.
Nevertheless, holders who oppose the class action settlement have
several options. First, they may appear at the fairness hearing, ex-
press their views and attempt to derail the settlement, and they may
appeal the settlement order. Second, they may file an involuntary
petition against the issuer under Chapter 11.29 However, only in rare
25. 694 F. Supp. at 455.
26. Las Colinas Corp., No. 88 C 9162, at 3-6 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 1989)(Exhibit A to
Order Approving Notice).
27. FED. R. CIV. PRoc. 23(e).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1988).
29. Under Section 303(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, an involuntary petition may
be filed by three or more entities with aggregate bona fide claims in excess of $5,000
more than the value of any lien. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1988). Under Section 303(e),
the petitioners may be required to indemnify the debtor for its expenses if the petition
is later dismissed under Section 303(i), and they may be required to pay punitive dam-
situations would the filing of an involuntary Chapter 11 petition con-
stitute rational wealth maximization for a particular bondholder.30
Since a bondholder's prospects under a traditional Chapter 11 case
will in all likelihood be worse than its prospects in a consensual re-
structuring effectuated through settlement of the class action, bond-
holders are less likely to pursue this dissident strategy.
B. Class Representatives and Unofficial Committees
One experienced observer noted that most restructurings of public
debt securities now "involve a process of negotiation."3' In order to
effectively participate in and protect their rights in such negotiations,
holders of bonds of a troubled issuer will often attempt to form an
unofficial bondholders committee in anticipation of or in response to
an issuer's restructuring proposal.32 Such committees may adopt by-
laws and other procedures and hire financial advisors and legal coun-
sel. In some cases, the issuer will agree to indemnify and pay the
expenses of these advisors. 33
Although unofficial committees can be useful in arriving at a fair,
negotiated restructuring plan with the issuer, these committees have
significant limitations. Unlike a traditional proceeding under Chap-
ter 11, where the United States Trustee selects an official creditors
committee,3 4 an unofficial committee in an out-of-court restructuring
has no such official sanction. It represents only those bondholders
who agree to be represented, and even then, there is no legal mecha-
nism for holding these bondholders to positions taken or agreements
made by the committee. Moreover, the unofficial committee does not
represent bondholders who choose not to be represented, and a re-
ages if the petition is dismissed because it was filed in bad faith. 11 U.S.C. § 303(e)
(1988).
30. Among other things, the direct costs of bankruptcy reorganization are signifi-
cantly greater than the direct costs of consensual debt restructuring. Compare Law-
rence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of
Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 291 (1990) (mean direct costs of bankruptcy measured at
2.8% of the book value of assets) with Stuart Gilson, Kose John & Larry H.P. Lang,
Troubled Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private Reorganization of
Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 315, 337 (1990) (mean direct costs of a private debt
restructuring measured at .65% of book value of assets). In addition, bondholders fare
poorly in Chapter 11 reorganizations in comparison to corporate managers, bankruptcy
lawyers and financial advisors. See Bradley & Rosenzwieg, supra note 7, at 1072
(losses suffered by bondholders of issuers who filed for protection under the 1978
Bankruptcy Act are more than 28 percentage points greater than the losses suffered by
bondholders prior to the adoption of such Act).
31. Nicholas P. Saggese, et al., A Practioner's Guide to Exchange Offers and Con-
sent Solicitations, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 527, 541 (1991).
32. Allen L. Weingarten, Consensual Non-Bankruptcy Restructuring of Public
Debt Securities, 23 SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 159, 160 (1990).
33. Id.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)(1988).
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structuring agreed to by a committee representing a majority of
bondholders may be attacked, in some cases successfully, by dissident
bondholders.35 In negotiating with an unofficial committee, there-
fore, an issuer has no assurance that the committee can deliver the
participation of the bondholders it claims to represent, let alone pro-
tect the negotiation against future attacks by bondholders that it does
not represent.
The class action approach provides a more satisfactory framework
for negotiating a debt restructuring. Once a class action is certified
under Rule 23(c)(1), the issuer can negotiate with the class represent-
atives with the assurance that they represent and speak for the en-
tire class and that the settlement, when approved, binds all class
members.
C. The Holdout Problem in Public Debt Restructurings
1. The Plague of Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act
Holders and issuers of public debt securities continue to be plagued
by Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act,3 6 which restricts the
freedom of an issuer and its bondholders to agree to a majority action
provision by limiting the ability of issuers to amend fundamental
payment terms of public debt securities without the consent of each
affected bondholder.37 Because it is often impossible to obtain unani-
35. For example, in the Chapter 11 case of In re Southland Corporation, a group
of minority investors, dissatisfied with the voting process and with the representation
provided by the unofficial committee which had negotiated with and agreed to a
"prepackaged" restructuring plan with Southland, filed objections to the prepackaged
plan after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition. See Unofficial Committee of Deben-
ture Holders' Objection to Confirmation of Debtor's Plan and the Adequacy of Disclo-
sure and Solicitation, dated November 20, 1990, and the Objection of Certain Preferred
Stockholders to Confirmation of Plan of Reorganization, dated November 21, 1990, In
re Southland Corp., No. 390-37119-HCA-11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Nov. 1990). Largely on
the basis of the objections filed by the dissident security holders, Judge Abramson in-
validated the solicitation and ordered a resolicitation. In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R.
211, 227 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (1988).
37. It is evident from a review of the statements and writings of the architects of
the Trust Indenture Act that they not only recognized that Section 316(b) would frus-
trate the ability of issuers to adjust their debt outside of bankruptcy, but that they ac-
tually favored the supervision of debt reorganizations by federal judges. See Mark J.
Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 234, 250-52 (1987)
(asserting that "Douglas and his colleagues at the SEC were not only aware that re-
quiring near unanimity would help induce bankruptcy, they welcomed the prospect.
They were convinced that insider machinations would damage bondholders and that
the only cure was a bankruptcy proceeding in which the judge scrutinized the
recapitalization").
mous consent to payment concessions from a body of diverse and dis-
persed bondholders, financially troubled issuers in the past have used
exchange offers to restructure their debt without resort to bank-
ruptcy. By offering to issue new debt securities with needed payment
modifications in exchange for the old debt securities (and often solic-
iting "exit" amendments that deprive the old debt securities of prior-
ity and covenant protections), a number of issuers have succeeded in
restructuring their public debt.38
Exchange offers, however, suffer a serious defect. A bondholder
who can successfully "hold out" of an exchange offer by a troubled
issuer often stands to reap a windfall at the expense of bondholders
who tender in the exchange. The successful holdout, who has made
no financial concessions, retains a bond with original payment terms
whose prospects for payment, even after the loss or modification of
financial covenants, may have hinproved because of the financial con-
cessions made by bondholders who exchange. The exchange offer, in
effect, results in a transfer of value from exchanging to nonexchang-
ing bondholders.
Even more important than the financial windfall conferred upon
holdouts, however, is the vulnerability of exchange offers to opportu-
nistic behavior by minority holders. An exchange offer seeking sig-
nificant financial concessions will typically be conditioned upon a
high level of acceptance, usually eighty-five to ninety-five percent.
While a financially troubled issuer often needs substantial participa-
tion in the exchange in order to obtain the overall financial relief it
seeks, the primary impetus for such high acceptance levels comes di-
rectly from the bondholders, who will object to the windfall con-
ferred upon fellow bondholders that refuse to participate. 39 As a
result of such acceptance levels, a holder or group of holders who
own or control just five to fifteen percent of an issue of securities can
effectively hold up an entire exchange offer. If the restructuring in-
volves concurrent exchange offers for multiple issues of debt securi-
ties, each offer conditioned upon the others, an effective blocking
position may consist of securities representing only a small fraction
38. Since 1985, there have been over 100 exchange offers for high-yield securities
that were characterized as "distressed"-that is, exchanges in which holders receive a
lower coupon or less than their original principal amount. See THE FIRST BOSTON
CORP. HIGH YIELD HANDBOOK 34 (Jan. 1990); THE FIRST BOSTON CORP. HIGH YIELD
HANDBOOK 17 (Jan. 1991).
39. In Southland, it was the bondholder steering committee-not the issuer-that
insisted upon a nonwaiveable 95% tender condition and "suggested a prepackaged plan
of reorganization as one way to insure participation by an acceptably high percentage
of holders." See Memorandum of The Southland Corporation (1) In Support of Confir-
mation of its Prepackaged Plan of Reorganization and (2) In Response to Objections to
Confirmation at 25, In re Southland Corp., No. 390-37119-HCA-11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
Dec. 7, 1990).
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of the company's capitalization-yet powerful enough to jeopardize a
restructuring proposal acceptable to the overwhelming majority of
securityholder.40
2. Prepackaged Bankruptcies as a Solution to the Holdout
Problem
In order to solve the holdout problem, a number of issuers have
proposed "prepackaged" plans of reorganization under Chapter 11,
either as alternatives to out-of-court exchange offers41 or as
"straight" plans.42 In a "prepackaged" bankruptcy, an issuer obtains
the acceptance of its creditors to a plan of reorganization before it
files for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The princi-
pal advantage of a prepackaged bankruptcy is that it enables issuers
to make use of rules under Chapter 11 that eliminate the "holdout"
problem and that foster negotiated restructurings, without incurring
the disruption and the costs of a traditional Chapter 11 proceeding.
Under Section 1126(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, a plan of reorganiza-
tion that impairs the claims of all holders of a class of claims requires
40. Even though Southland obtained the minimum 95% tender levels for four out
of its six issues of debt securities and preferred stock, it had to resort to Chapter 11
bankruptcy because it obtained the acceptances of only 91% of the holders of its junior
subordinated debentures and only 82% of the holders of its subordinated debentures.
See In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R. 211, 219 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
41. In addition to Southland, combined exchange offer/prepackaged plans have in-
cluded: Sunshine Mining Co.; Sunshine Precious Metals, Inc., Preliminary Prospectus
(May 22, 1991) (SEC File No. 33-40783); Munsingwear, Inc., Preliminary Prospectus
(January 17, 1991) (SEC File No. 33-38565); Price Communications Corp., Preliminary
Prospectus (October 4, 1990) (SEC File No. 33-37190); Westmark Sys., Inc., Tracor Avi-
ation, Inc. and TDH, Inc., Preliminary Prospectus (August 27, 1990) (SEC File No. 33-
36576) (prepackaged solicitation failed; issuer filed for Chapter 11); Interco Inc., Pre-
liminary Prospectus, (May 17, 1990) (SEC File No. 33-34965); NBI, Inc., Preliminary
Prospectus (May 11, 1990) (SEC File No. 33-34861); Republic Health Corp., Prospectus
(November 13, 1989) (SEC File No. 33-19544) (filed prepackaged plan in December
1989 and emerged on May 11, 1990); Las Colinas Corp., Prospectus, (May 23, 1989)
(SEC File No. 33-24488).
42. In the straight prepackaged Chapter 11 case of JPS Textile Group, Inc., the
issuer restructured approximately $600 million of debt, classified in five classes,
through a plan that was confirmed on March 21, 1991, just 40 days after it filed its
Chapter 11 petition. John J. Huber, Bryant B. Edwards & Jeffrey C. Soza, Restructur-
ing High-Yield Securities Through Prepackaged Bankruptcies, INSIGHTS, May 1991, at
3. See also Charter Medical Corp., Prospectus (April 24, 1992) (straight prepackaged
plan of reorganization); Intermark, Inc., Preliminary Prospectus (March 31, 1992)
(SEC File No. 33-46885) (straight prepackaged Chapter 11 plan of reorganization;
Memorex Telex N.V. and Memorex Telex Corp., Prospectus (November 21, 1991)
(straight prepackaged plan of reorganization); MB Holdings, Inc., Disclosure Statement
(Oct. 16, 1991) (straight prepackaged plan of reorganization); Trump Taj Mahal, Disclo-
sure Statement (June 5, 1990); Vyquest, Disclosure Statement (August 8, 1989).
acceptance by only two-thirds in amount and a majority in number of
the claims of the class that vote on the plan.43
3. Mandatory Class Action Lawsuits as a Solution to the Holdout
Problem
Class action lawsuits brought by a class of bondholders for the pur-
pose of effectuating a restructuring should normally be categorized
under either Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. As such, the outcome will be binding upon all mem-
bers of the class without any right on the part of individual class
members to opt out." A restructuring effected through the settle-
ment of such a class action, including a restructuring that impairs the
principal or interest or other payment terms of debt securities, will
bind all members of a class of bondholders. This ability to bind non-
assenting bondholders to a settlement arises out of the fundamental
equitable powers of a federal court and is not affected by contractual
provisions to the contrary, including provisions required by Section
316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act.45 In addition, such a settlement is
not affected by the contract impairment clause of the United States
Constitution, which restricts state but not federal action. Further-
more, if the settlement satisfies the procedural requirements of Rule
23, it should also satisfy the due process clause of the Constitution.46
D. Risks of Prepackaged Plans
The filing of a petition for relief under Chapter 11, even pursuant
to a prepackaged plan, is a heavy-handed solution to the holdout
problem that presents a number of risks. In determining whether to
insist upon a prepackaged plan as a solution to the holdout problem,
bondholders should determine whether the mandatory class action
approach is not a kinder, gentler alternative with fewer negative ef-
fects on the underlyling business of the issuer.
1. Effects on Business and Trade Credit
In a service or consumer products business, a bankruptcy-includ-
ing a prepackaged bankruptcy--can diminish consumer confidence,
reducing revenues and affecting the core business. Even short bank-
ruptcies divert management's attention and, because of the need to
apply for court approval of many decisions,47 impair management's
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1988).
44. See infra Section III.
45. See infra Sections IV(A) and (B).
46. See infra Section IV(D).
47. For example, Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code requires the debtor to obtain
court approval to use, sell or lease property of the estate other than in the ordinary
course of business. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1988). Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code re-
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ability to take advantage of business opportunities and to respond to
competitive threats.
Once a petition under Chapter 11 is filed, the debtor is generally
prohibited from paying claims that arose prior to the filing of the pe-
tition until the consummation of the plan of reorganization. 48 As a
result, even if the issuer proposes a prepackaged plan that does not
impair trade credit, parties that supply goods or services on credit
may tighten their credit terms, or stop shipments of goods or the pro-
vision of services, in anticipation of the automatic deferral of such
payments upon a Chapter 11 filing.49
In contrast, while resolution of a mandatory class action may divert
management's attention, it is less likely to be viewed by the public as
a threat to the issuer's survival and may have a more benign effect on
the issuer's business. Moreover, because the mandatory class action
approach does not involve an automatic cessation of payment of
prepetition debt, it is less threatening to trade creditors and other
suppliers of goods and services.
2. Restrictions on Use of Professionals
In a Chapter 11 proceeding, the employment and compensation of
financial advisors is governed by sections 327, 328, 330 and 1103 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Among other things, these provisions permit a
bankruptcy judge to determine whether the proposed compensation
is "reasonable" based upon the "nature, the extent, and the value of
such services, the time spent on such services and the cost of compa-
quires the debtor to obtain court approval in order to obtain credit, other than un-
secured credit incurred in the normal course of business. 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(a)-(e) (1988).
Also, the bankruptcy court must generally approve payments to the debtor's attorneys
and advisors under Sections 327 through 330 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 327-
330 (1988).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (1988). See, e.g., Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v.
Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 962 (1988); In re FCX,
Inc., 60 B.R. 405, 410 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
49. Southland, which had extensive trade credit, managed its trade credit problem
by (a) proposing a plan that did not impair its existing trade credit and (b) obtaining a
court order upon filing a petition that permitted Southland to continue to pay trade
credit in the normal course of business, including credit extended prior to the filing of
the petition. See Emergency Order Granting and Modifying Authorization to Pay
Prepetition Claims of Trade Creditors Who Consent to Continue to Reinstate Custom-
ary Trade Terms, In re Southland Corp., No. 390-37119-HCA-11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Oc-
tober 24, 1990). As a result of these actions, Southland avoided having to identify and
solicit the acceptances of its trade creditors, and it was able generally to maintain its
trade credit on existing terms. Southland's approach, however, depended upon its abil-
ity to obtain a court order permitting payment of prepetition trade credit; such relief
may not be obtainable in all cases.
rable services . *..."50 However, these sections, by their terms, do
not govern arrangements entered into, and services performed, prior
to the commencement of a Chapter 11 case because all these sections
contemplate employment of professionals "with the court's ap-
proval."51 This was not an oversight. Section 329 of the Bankruptcy
Code specifically provides for ex post facto review of compensation
paid or agreed to be paid to a debtor's attorney within "one year
before the date of the filing of the petition."52 Even though compen-
sation of financial advisors is addressed and governed by the sections
mentioned above, there is a conspicuous absence in the Bankruptcy
Code of a provision comparable to Section 329 that provides for re-
view of prepetition services performed by financial advisors.
Nevertheless, bankruptcy courts have strongly challenged debtors'
obligations to honor prepetition commitments to financial advisors
and have even been willing to dishonor previously approved fee ar-
rangements. 53 As a result of this and other restrictions on the pay-
ment of investment professionals in Chapter 11 cases, many
investment banking firms have questioned their continued interest in
Chapter 11 cases.54
These restrictions, which could limit the ability of the bondholders
and the issuer to employ the most talented investment banking pro-
50. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1988).
51. Section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the trustee, "with the
court's approval," may employ professionals "that do not hold or represent an interest
adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested persons, to represent or assist the
trustee in carrying out the trustee's duties ...." 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (1988). Similarly,
Section 1103(a) provides that a creditors' committee, "with the court's approval," may
employ professionals. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988). Section 328(a) provides that a trustee
or a creditors' committee, "with the court's approval," may employ professionals on
"any reasonable terms and conditions" and may later change such terms and condi-
tions if they have proved "improvident" in light of later developments. 11 U.S.C.
§ 328(a) (1988). Finally, Section 330(a) provides for payment of "reasonable compensa-
tion" to professionals employed under Sections 327 or 1103. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1988).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 329 (1988).
53. See, e.g., Michele Galen & Tim Smart, Legal Affairs, Bus. WK., Sept. 30, 1991,
at 60 (noting that the court in the Gillett Holdings Chapter 11 case rejected the
debtor's preexisting agreement to pay financial advisors a success fee upon successful
completion of the case). For a particularly egregious example of the willingness of
bankruptcy courts to dishonor previously agreed and approved fee arrangements for
investment bankers, see In re Gillett Holdings, Inc., 137 B.R. 475 (D. Colo. 1992) (court
slashed the fees of the financial advisor for the applicable period from $800,000 to
$298,343-a reduction of $501,343, or almost 63% of the amount agreed to by the debtor
and approved in an earlier order by the court).
54. See, e.g., Barbara Franklin, Accounting Angst; Controversy Around New Bank-
ruptcy Fee Rules, 206 N.Y.L.J. 5 (1991) (reporting that, as a result of new fee reim-
bursement guidelines adopted in the Southern District of New York for Chapter 11
cases, Norman Brown, a managing director for Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, stated:
"Every firm involved in this business is going to have to reconsider whether they con-
tinue in the business and how they do it").
[Vol. 19: 875, 1992] Restructuring Technique
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
fessionals, would not apply to a restructuring accomplished through a
class action settlement.
3. Risk of Resolicitation and Loss of Control
One of the principal advantages of prepackaged plans over tradi-
tional reorganization proceedings is that they permit corporate man-
agers to stay in control of the reorganization process. In a
prepackaged plan, a corporation does not submit to the jurisdiction of
a bankruptcy court until negotiations with creditors have been com-
pleted and all necessary creditor approvals to the plan have been ob-
tained. In theory, once a prepackaged plan of reorganization is filed,
there is little to do but confirm and consummate the plan.
In practice, however, it appears that there are substantial risks that
a prepackaged plan may run into legal difficulties after a Chapter 11
petition has been filed. One commentator stated:
Because much of the work in a prepackaged bankruptcy case is done prior to
the Chapter 11 filing and outside the purview and control of the bankruptcy
court, there is significantly less certainty than in a traditional Chapter 11 as to
how the court will deal with critical legal issues that may arise in the case. 55
In Southland, for example, the issuer filed its petition for reorgani-
zation on October 24, 1990, after it believed that it had received suffi-
cient acceptances of the plan to obtain confirmation of the plan by
the bankruptcy court.5 6 Once Southland submitted itself to jurisdic-
tion of the bankruptcy court, a number of dissident security holders
filed objections challenging the adequacy of a number of disclosures
in the prospectus and challenging Southland's procedure for counting
votes for purposes of the numerosity requirement-i.e., the require-
ment that a plan of reorganization be approved by fifty percent of the
holders of claims of each class.5 7 In addition, the SEC, which had
made over 400 comments to Southland's registration statement
before it was declared effective, filed an objection to provisions of the
plan which attempted to release, pursuant to Section 524 of the
55. Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, et al., Prepackaged Plans of Reorganization, in A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO OUT-OF-COURT RESTRUCTURINGS AND PREPACKAGED PLANS OF
REORGANIZATION 4-1, 4-55 (Nicholas P. Saggese & Alesia Ranney-Marinelli eds., 1991).
56. In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R. at 219.
57. See generally Unofficial Committee of Debenture Holders' Objection to Con-
firmation of Debtor's Plan and the Adequacy of Disclosure and Solicitation, dated No-
vember 20, 1990, and the Objection of Certain Preferred Shareholders to Confirmation
of Plan of Reorganization, dated November 21, 1990, In re Southland Corp., No. 390-
37119-HCA-11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
Bankruptcy Code, certain nondebtor third parties.58
As a result of the objections, the bankruptcy court invalidated the
original solicitation and ordered Southland to resolicit votes for
Southland's plan of reorganization from all holders of claims and in-
terests, including those that were beneficial owners as of December
13, 1990, some seven weeks after the completion of the original solici-
tation.5 9 A number of substantive economic changes were made to
the plan prior to the resolicitation, including the percentage of equity
retained by the former owners, the provisions for release of claims,
and alternative security packages for certain classes of creditors.60
The revised plan was eventually approved by the necessary classes of
creditors and was confirmed by Judge Abramson on February 21,
1991, 120 days after the original Chapter 11 petition was filed.61
While Southland eventually succeeded in confirming a plan sub-
stantially similar to the original plan, Southland's difficulties illus-
trate some of the risks inherent in using Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Judge Abramson himself stated that the provi-
sions of Section 1126(b) "amount to a form of 'Russian Roulette' for
the proponent of a prepetition plan."62 Once a debtor has filed a plan
and submitted to the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court, a number of
events might occur that could derail the prepackaged plan process.
For example, there is considerable doubt about what law consti-
tutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law" for purposes of Section 1126(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code.63 If the law or regulation under which the
plan acceptance was solicited is determined by the bankruptcy judge
not to constitute applicable nonbankruptcy law, the judge must then
consider whether it was solicited after disclosure of "adequate infor-
mation."64 Because the definition of "adequate information" is vague
and subjective, an inquiry into the adequacy of disclosure at the plan
confirmation stage is fraught with the danger that a bankruptcy
court may second-guess the disclosure in an issuer's solicitation docu-
ments and invalidate a plan already approved by the creditors. Simi-
58. See generally Objection of the SEC to Confirmation of Debtors' Plan, In re
Southland Corp., No. 390-37119-HCA-11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 1990).
59. In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R. at 227.
60. See generally Disclosure Statement and Summary of Plan, approved January
23, 1991, In re Southland Corp., No. 390-37119-HCA-11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).
61. Huber, Edwards & Soza, supra note 43, at 3.
62. In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R. at 225-26.
63. Huber, Edwards & Soza, supra note 42, at 6.
64. Section 1125(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states that "adequate information" is
"information of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in
light of the nature and history of the debtor and the condition of the debtor's books
and records, that would enable the hypothetical reasonable investor typical of holders
of claims or interests of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the
plan, but adequate information need not include such information about any other pos-
sible or proposed plan .. " 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
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lar challenges could be mounted based upon the feasibility65 of, and
the classification of claims66 in, a prepackaged plan.
If there have been sufficient transfers of securities to investors
with different investment strategies, a resolicitation based upon one
of these challenges may yield a different result. Even without such
transfers, there is no assurance that security holders will vote the
same way twice. As Southland illustrates, a number of events might
occur that could cause a prepetition compromise to break down com-
pletely after the filing of the petition, resulting in resort to a tradi-
tional Chapter 11 process that may take months and even years to
complete.
On the other hand, a mandatory class action lawsuit presents con-
siderably more manageable risks for bondholders and the issuer.
Under Rule 23, a federal judge is empowered only to approve the
terms of the settlement reached by opposing parties to the action; he
has no general powers to appoint a trustee or an examiner, to ap-
prove corporate transactions, or to exercise the other considerable
powers enjoyed by a bankruptcy judge with respect to a debtor in
possession.
4. Mandatory Appointment of an Examiner
In In re Revco, D.S., Inc.,67 the Sixth Circuit held that the appoint-
ment of an examiner is mandatory upon the request of a party in in-
terest or the United States Trustee in cases where certain of the
debtor's fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts exceed $5 million.68
Although the granting of a motion for appointment of an examiner
in and of itself should not affect the validity of a prepetition solicita-
tion, it could significantly delay the confirmation and consummation
of a plan and burden the estate with considerable costs and ex-
penses.69 In addition, the mandatory nature of the appointment pro-
65. Section 1129(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code requires the court to determine
that confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by liquidation or the need for
further financial reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988).
66. One commentator stated: "Bondholders may vehemently object to being sin-
gled out for reductions in their claims while other unsecured creditors 'ride through'
the bankruptcy unimpaired." Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 55, at 4-58, § 4.03[c].
67. 898 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1990).
68. Id. at 500-01.
69. The examiner's report in the Chapter 11 case of Interco, Inc. reportedly cost
the bankruptcy estate more than $3.7 million in legal and financial consulting fees.
Alison Frankel, Reorganizing Interco: What Did It Take?, AM. LAW., May 1992, at 25.
vides a dissident bondholder with a weapon through which additional
leverage can be exerted.
In comparison, the class action approach is not subject to an
equivalent provision that could delay completion of the settlement.
The only related threat that a bondholder could make is the filing of
an involuntary bankruptcy petition, which as described above, would
not normally constitute rational bondholder behavior.70
E. SEC Registration and Review
Section 1145(a) of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from registration
under the Securities Act securities offered or sold "under a plan."71
While Section 1145(a) would thus exempt the sale of securities issued
in a prepackaged plan, it does not provide an exemption for "offers"
of securities which may be deemed to be made by soliciting accept-
ances of the plan, because there is no Chapter 11 case pending at the
time the offers are made.
As a result, "offers" made in connection with the solicitation of ac-
ceptances must be made pursuant to a prospectus filed as part of a
registration statement,72 or pursuant to an exemption from registra-
tion under the Securities Act. To date, most prepackaged bankrupt-
cies have been solicited in connection with alternative exchange
offers. Because issuers are simultaneously offering to exchange se-
curities, issuers may use the prospectus or exemption relied upon for
the exchange offers in order to cover the prepetition plan solicita-
tions. However, issuers soliciting acceptances to a "straight" prepack-
aged plan, such as JPS Textile,7 3 do not have a concurrent exchange
offer on which to rely. Such issuers must register the prepetition of-
fers or comply with an applicable Securities Act exemption, such as
Section 3(a)(9) (which exempts certain issuer exchanges), 74 Section
4(2) (which exempts transactions not involving a "public offering"), 75
or Regulation D (which provides a safe harbor for certain private
placements) .76
On the other hand, the class action approach can avoid SEC review
altogether, since the securities issued in connection with a settlement
of a lawsuit may be offered and sold under the exemption provided
70. See supra Section II(A)(3).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1145(a) (1988).
72. Securities Act of 1933, § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1988).
73. See supra note 42.
74. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1988). The Disclosure
Statement in JPS Textile revealed the issuer's reliance upon Section 3(a)(9) of the Se-
curities Act to exempt "the offer of new securities which may be deemed to be made
pursuant to the solicitation." JPS Textile Group, Inc., Disclosure Statement, Decem-
ber 21, 1990, at 2.
75. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988).
76. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (1991).
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by Section 3(a)(10). 77 This is a significant advantage, since review by
the SEC staff has been particularly grueling in restructuring situa-
tions. For example, in the Southland restructuring, Southland re-
ceived sixteen sets of SEC staff comments (totaling more than 400)
over an eleven-month period before the SEC declared the registra-
tion statement effective.78 In another example, the SEC staff did not
declare the registration statement in the recent Western Union Cor-
poration restructuring effective until thirteen months after it was ini-
tially filed79 While such delays may cause frustration for an issuer
attempting to restructure its securities, it is the bondholders who are
particularly harmed by regulatory delays. The uncertainty regarding
the outcome and timing of a restructuring generally causes securities
to trade at depressed levels, severely impairing the liquidity of the
investment.8 0
III. MANDATORY BONDHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS UNDER RULE 23
A. General Requirements
A federal class action may be certified if the prerequisites specified
in Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are satisfied. The burden is upon the party seeking certification of
the class to show that those prerequisites exist.81 According to Rule
77. See infra Section V.
78. In its "prepackaged bankruptcy" case, The Southland Corporation described
the comments it received from the SEC staff:
Between November 9, 1989, when Southland made its first filing with the
SEC, and October 4, 1990, when the SEC declared effective Southland's post-
effective amendment relating to its restructuring, Southland received and re-
sponded to over 400 comments from the SEC on virtually every aspect of its
proposed restructuring. The SEC's comments were received over a long pe-
riod of time and dealt with a panoply of disclosure and substantive issues,
ranging from general conceptual' comments to suggestions for specific lan-
guage. Between September 12, 1990, and October 3, 1990, Southland received
four different requests from the SEC, containing approximately 100 com-
ments, on what eventually became the October Prospectus. These comments
addressed, inter alia, the liquidation analysis, forecasts, debtor-in-possession
financing, voting and other issues.
Memorandum of The Southland Corporation (1) In Support of Confirmation of its
Prepackaged Plan of Reorganization and (2) In Response to Objections to Confirma-
tion at 25, In re Southland Corp., No. 390-37119-HCA-11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Dec. 7,
1990).
79. See Westein Union Corp., S-4 Registration Statement (File No. 33-28883), filed
May 31, 1989 and declared effective on June 14, 1990. The Western Union restructur-
ing was not completed until 1991.
80. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
81. Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1308-09 (9th Cir. 1977).
Either the plaintiff or the defendant in an action may move for class certification. In
23(a), four general requirements must be met:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or de-
fenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or "defenses of
the class," and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.8 2
These requirements are generally satisfied when bondholders of
the same issue of bonds sue an issuer.8 3 Typically, a class of bond-
holders consists of so many members that joinder of each member is
impracticable84 and any issues affecting the terms of the bonds will
be common to all members of the class.8 5 Further, any bondholder
who chooses to represent the class will have claims against the corpo-
ration that are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.86 Fi-
nally, the interests of the class will be adequately protected as long as
the class representative is represented by competent counsel, does
not possess antagonism toward other members of the class, shares in-
re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 895
(N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1171 (1985). In any event, the party requesting certification must allege the
facts necessary to bring the proposed class action in the pleadings. Weathers v. Peters
Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197, 1200 (6th Cir. 1974). Despite the existence of the neces-
sary prerequisites, the trial court retains discretion over whether to certify the class.
City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir.
1969). Thus, the trial judge's determination will be reversed only upon a showing of
abuse of discretion. Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 549 F.2d 1330, 1332
(9th Cir. 1977).
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
83. There are at least two common grounds upon which bondholders might wish
to sue a corporation. First, if a corporation defaults on principal or interest payments
to bondholders, the bondholders might bring an action to compel payment of the prin-
cipal or interest due them. See, e.g., Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983). Second, if the cor-
poration, upon foreseeing an impending liquidity crisis, proposed a debt restructuring
plan that affected the bondholders, the bondholders might sue to attack the proposed
plan. See, e.g., Eliasen v. Green Bay & W. R.R. Co., 93 F.R.D. 408 (E.D. Wis. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 874 (1983).
84. See, e.g., Rievman v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 618 F. Supp. 592 (S.D.N.Y 1985)
(more than 1,000 bondholders nationwide); Zeffiro v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co.,
96 F.R.D. 567, aff'd, 705 F.2d 461 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 874 (E.D.Pa. 1983)
(requirement "undoubtedly" met where more than 300 debenture holders); Citizens
Banking Co. v. Monticello State Bank, 143 F.2d 261, (8th Cir. 1944) (class of 40 note
holders held sufficiently numerous); Fidelis Corp. v. Litton Indus., 293 F.Supp. 164
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that 35 stockholders constitute a class in a securities fraud
case).
85. See, e.g., Zeffjro, 96 F.R.D. at 569 (stating that "The acts or omissions of de-
fendants raise several legal and factual questions which will necessarily be answered
in the same way for each class member. Defendants' responsibilities were the same
with respect to each debenture holder, and defendants' actions affected all class mem-
bers in the same manner.").
86. See, e.g., Eliasen v. Green Bay & W. R. R. Co., 93 F.R.D. 408 (E.D. Wis. 1982)
(noting that a representative holder of the same class of bonds as class members would
have claims typical of the claims or defenses of the class); Zeffiro, 96 F.R.D. 567 (stat-
ing that "the alignment of interests between named plaintiffs' claims and those of
other (debenture holders] is obvious").
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terests with absent class members, and is not in collusion with the
party opposing the class.87
In order for the court to certify a mandatory class action, at least
one of the parties must move for a determination by the court that
the action may be maintained as a class action.88 Ordinarily, the
party advocating for class certification alleges the facts necessary to
satisfy the prerequisites specified in Rule 23.89 In a bondholder law-
suit, the issuer would allege facts that provide support for certifica-
tion under Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) so that a mandatory class
may be certified.
Determinations as to whether a class will be certified can be made
on the basis of the pleadings alone where sufficient facts are al-
leged.90 However, in some cases, discovery or other precertification
proceedings are conducted in order to gather additional facts neces-
sary to the certification issue.9 1 The final determination as to class
certification rests within the discretion of the trial judge92 and usu-
ally depends upon two factors: "the convenience of maintaining [the
action] as a class action [balanced against] the need to guarantee ade-
quate representation of class members."93 Generally, however, the
certification of a class action is favored in doubtful cases. 94
87. Zeffiro, 96 F.R.D. 567 (holding that plaintiff adequately represented class of
debenture holders even though plaintiff had sold debentures and had chosen to sue the
issuer rather than accept the exchange offer accepted by other debenture holders);
"Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (discussing requirements for ade-
quacy of representation). See infra Section III(I) regarding possible challenges to the
certification of the class on grounds of collusion.
88. Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 712 (5th Cir. 1973). The court may also
certify the class on its own motion. Id. In any event, both parties to the action have an
equal duty to raise the class certification issue as soon as is practicable after the com-
mencement of the litigation. Fujita v. Sumitomo Bank, 70 F.R.D. 406, 411 (N.D. Cal.
1975). However, practicality has an elastic meaning in this context, and classes have
been certified following settlement negotiations. See, e.g., Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
89. See, e.g., Valentino v. Howlett, 528 F.2d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 1976). In fact, the
burden of proof of showing that the prerequisites are satisfied falls on the party seek-
ing class certification. Id.
90. Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1973).
91. Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 1030, 1037-38 (5th Cir. 1981).
92. Hornreich v. Plant Indus., 535 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1976). The determination
will be reversed only if there was an abuse of discretion. Id.
93. Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 F.2d 1058, 1061 (8th Cir. 1975). See gener-
ally 21 Am. Jur. Trials 678 (1984) (detailing the factors normally taken into account by
trial judges in class certification decisions).
94. Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 785 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946
(1985). The class certification may be conditional in doubtful cases. Thus, the certifi-
cation can be revoked where problems later present themselves and militate against
certification. In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90 (9th Cir. 1974).
B. Types of C7ass Actions Under Rule 23
The potential class action must also fall into one of the categories
specified in Rule 23(b). According to Rule 23(b), four types of actions
are properly certifiable as class actions: actions under Rules
23(b)(1)(A), 23(b)(1)(B), 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3).
C. Rule 23(b)(1)(A) Actions: Avoiding Inconsistent or Varying
Adjudications for the Opposing Party
Actions certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) are maintained as class
actions, rather than as individual lawsuits, to avoid the risk of "incon-
sistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class." 95 Simply put, if there is a risk that
individual lawsuits might result in incompatible judgments, such that
the defendant opposing the class could not comply with one judg-
ment without violating the terms of another, the proposed action is
properly certifiable as a class action.9
The possibility of incompatible judgments is a particular risk when
individual security holders under the same instrument are permitted
to pursue their claims individually. For example, the Rules Advisory
Committee, which drafted Rule 23, illustrated a Rule 23(b)(1)(A)
class action by describing a suit brought by municipal bondholders
concerning the validity of a municipal bond issue.97 Under separate
actions, one bondholder might receive a judgment which declares the
bond issue invalid, while a different bondholder might receive a judg-
ment which merely limits or conditions the future issuance of the
bonds.98 The two inconsistent judgments would establish incompati-
ble courses of conduct for the municipality-the municipality could
not stop issuance of the bonds at the same time it continued to issue
bonds subject to the required conditions.99 In contrast, a class action
would result in a uniform adjudication of the issue.100
95. FED. R. Civ. Poc. 23(b)(1)(A).
96. 6A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, L. ED. § 12:175 (1989). However, the risk of incom-
patible adjudications must be real. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d.
Cir. 1968). In Eisen, the court held that where individual claims were so small that
there was little risk that individual claims would be pursued outside of the class action,
certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) would be denied. Id.
97. Advisory Committee's Note to Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 39 FR.D. 98,
100 (1966) [hereinafter Advisory Note]. See also Norman C. Sabbey, Comment, Rule
23: Categories of Subsection (b) 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 539, 540 (1969).
98. Id.
99. IM See also Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) (holding
that under former Equity Rule 38, a suit by policyholders attacking a reorganization of
an insurance company was properly brought as a mandatory class action in order to
avoid "conflicting judgments").
100. It is important to note that Rule 23(b)(1)(A) actions do not apply to situations
where class members seek primarily money damages from the party opposing the
[Vol. 19: 875, 1992] Restructuring Technique
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Likewise, in Rievman v. Burlington Northern Railroad Com-
pany,10 1 the court certified a bondholder action under Rule
23(b)(1)(A) because of the "risk of inconsistent or varying adjudica-
tions."1o2 The issuer, by offering to substitute government securities
as collateral, had attempted to get indenture trustees to release prop-
erty worth "billions of dollars" that secured only $117 million of rail-
road bonds issued in 1896.103 The risk of incompatible adjudications
existed because, if separate suits were brought, some judgments
might allow for the substitution of securities while other judgments
might prohibit the substitution. The subsequent history of the case
illustrates the risk. After entry of the preliminary injunction and
certification of the class, the class representatives reached a settle-
ment with the issuer valued at approximately $45 million more to the
bondholders than the original agreement, which was intended to be
equivalent to market value. 104 Even so, the settlement, which was
binding upon all bondholders, was opposed by. holders of approxi-
mately six percent of the bonds.O5
Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Phillips Pe-
troleum Co. v. Shutts,106 Rule 23(b)(1)(A) actions were generally con-
sidered mandatory class actions07-that is, the judgment rendered in
class. Sabbey, supra note 97, at 540. This is because the purpose behind Rule
23(b)(1)(A) is to prevent situations where the party opposing the class is faced with
incompatible standards of conduct. Id. "Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is not meant to apply, how-
ever, where the risk of inconsistent results in individual actions is merely the possibil-
ity that the defendants will prevail in some cases and not in others, thereby paying
damages to some claimants and not others." In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
506 F. Supp. 762, 789 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (emphasis omitted). See also In re Dennis Green-
man Sec. Litig., 829 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1987); In re Bendectin Prod. Liab. Litig., 749
F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984); and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., 523
F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976). But see 1 HERBERT B. NEW-
BERG, NEWBERG ON CLAss AcTIONS § 4.05, at 279 (2d ed. 1985) (citing cases certified
under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) where the major, if not predominant, remedy sought was
money damages).
101. 618 F. Supp. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
102. Id. at 595.
103. Id. at 594.
104. Rievman v. Burlington N.R.R. Co., 118 F.R.D. 29, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
105. Id. at 34. See also Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(holding that an action by debenture holders to compel conversion was properly classi-
fied as a Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class action).
106. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). See infra Section III(G) for a discussion of the effect of
Shutts.
107. The trial court retains discretion to require notice to all class members in Rule
23(b)(1)(A) actions. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2). In addition, a minority of federal courts
require an opt out provision if it is determined that due process concerns mandate such
a provision. Bauman v. United States Dist. Ct., 557 F.2d 650, 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
those cases bound all members of the class, whether or not they
wished to participate in the action.1 08 This conclusion is derived from
the express terms of Rule 23, which require notice and the right to
opt out only from Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.10 9 Additionally, there
is an implicit preference for unified treatment in class actions in
which equitable relief is sought.11o
Further, aggregation of claims is permitted under Rule
23(b)(1)(A).111 Accordingly, the class members in a Rule 23(b)(1)(A)
action may combine the dollar amounts of their claims to satisfy the
$50,000 amount in controversy requirement imposed in federal diver-
sity suits. 112 The ability to aggregate claims in a federal class action
is significant, since aggregation generally is not permitted in a Rule
23(b)(3) class action, and each class member must individually satisfy
the minimum amount in controversy requirement.1 1 3
D. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) Actions: Avoiding Adverse Effects on C7ass
Members
While Rule 23(b)(1)(A) actions prevent adverse effects upon par-
ties opposing the class, the purpose of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) actions is to
prevent adverse effects upon class members.114 Rule 23(b)(1)(B) ac-
tions prevent situations where individual actions are adjudicated
"which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interest of
the other [class] members not parties to the adjudications or substan-
108. Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295, 300 (E.D. La. 1970). The only
qualification is that the court must describe those persons whom it deems included in
the class. Id.
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), (c)(2).
110. Miller & Crump, supra note 14, at 38.
111. Aggregation of claims is allowed because the class members in a Rule
23(b)(1)(A) action unite to enforce a single claim in which they have a common and
undivided interest. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969). Aggregation is permit-
ted in most Rule 23(b)(1) actions. 6A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, L. ED. § 12:20 (1989). See
generally S.R. Shapiro, Annotation, Right, in Suit Brought as Class Action, to Aggre-
gate Claims or Interests of Members of Class in Order to Satisfy Minimum Jurisdic-
tional Amount Requirement in Federal District Court, 3 A.L.R. FED. 372 (1970 &
Supp. 1991).
112. Gallagher v. Continental Ins. Co., 502 F.2d 827, 831 (10th Cir. 1974). In any
event, if the issue in the action involves the alleged violation of federal securities laws,
federal question jurisdiction would exist. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1991) (conferring
jurisdiction upon federal courts in civil actions where the matter in controversy arises
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States). See also Continental
Assurance Co. v. Macleod-Stedman, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (where a cor-
poration sought a court's approval to undertake a section 3(a)(10) exchange, and the
court exercised its jurisdiction based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
113. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
114. Sabbey, supra note 97, at 540-41. "[T]he focus of the Rule [is] on the effect of
an individual action on the interests of those who have rights similar to those of the
individual bringing suit, rather than on the danger of imposing incompatible standards
of conduct on the defendant." 6A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, L.ED. § 12:181 (1989) (foot-
note omitted).
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tially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests." 115
Professor Miller has written: "The paradigm Rule 23(b)(1)(B) case
is one in which there are multiple claimants to a limited fund ....
There is a risk, if litigants are allowed to proceed on an individual
basis, that those who sue first will deplete the fund and leave nothing
for the latecomers.' ' 1 16 By definition, it is impossible to resolve sepa-
rately individual claims involving common rights or limited funds.117
For instance, if several persons have a claim against a fund which is
insufficient to satisfy all of the claims, a separate action brought by
an individual against the fund might, as a practical matter, foreclose
actions by the other persons. That is, the fund might be exhausted
before all members of the class were able to protect their interests.
However, if the action were brought as a class action, all of the
claims could be finally determined, and each class member could re-
ceive his or her pro rata share of the fund.118 Similarly, cases involv-
ing a breach of trust by an indenture trustee or other fiduciary are
appropriately brought under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).119
A bondholder suit that attacks a corporate reorganization has been
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). The absent class members need only be practically
foreclosed from pursuing a separate action. 6A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, L. ED. § 12:181
(1989). However, the fact that an action will have only a precedential or stare decisis
effect on later cases is not sufficient to satisfy Rule 23(b)(1)(B). Larionoff v. United
States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1181 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1976), affd 431 U.S. 864 (1977).
116. Arthur R. Miller, An Overview of Federal Class Actions: Past, Present, and Fu-
ture, 4 JUST. Sys. J. 197, 211 (1978). See also Advisory Note, supra note 97, at 101.
However, where the fund was not limited, certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) was not
warranted. Zimmerman v. Bell, 800 F.2d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 1986).
117. Miller & Crump, supra note 14, at 40. See, e.g., Bush v. Rewald, [1986-87
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,999 (D. Haw. 1986) (mandatory settle-
ment classes confirmed under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b)(1)(B) where, because of lim-
ited fund of insurance proceeds, "only a settlement which includes, on a mandatory
basis, all potential claimants with similar claims, and provides for an overall system of
allocation, can be fair.").
118. See, eg., Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915) (holding that in-
surer's contingency fund was treated appropriately as a unit in which all policyholders
were joined). For other examples of limited fund cases in a reorganization context, see
Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952) (where disposition of fund by court
in class action was held binding on absent class members); Heffernan v. Bennett & Ar-
mour, 243 P.2d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952) (ruling that a class action consisting of the
creditors of a debtor who made fraudulent transfers will be binding against all those
creditors who present claims or those creditors who, after notice, fail to do so.)
119. See, e.g., Zeffiro, 96 F.R.D. 567 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (where plaintiffs alleged the vio-
lation of indenture provisions). The Advisory Committee Notes suggest that Rule
23(b)(1)(B) certification is appropriate in "an action which charges a breach of trust by
an indenture trustee or other fiduciary similarly affecting the members of a large class
of security holders or other beneficiaries, and which requires an accounting or like
measures to restore the subject of the trust." Advisory Note, supra note 97, at 98.
held to qualify as a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) action.120 In Eliasen v. Green
Bay & Western Railroad Company,121 a representative bondholder
attacked a merger and reorganization of a railroad company on be-
half of a class of bondholders. Under the terms of the related inden-
ture, the representative claimed that the class was entitled to a pro
rata distribution of the proceeds flowing from the merger and reor-
ganization. The class representative requested liquidation of the rail-
road company, if necessary, to satisfy the claims of the bondholders.
The trial court ruled that the action was certifiable as a Rule
23(b)(1)(B) class action because there was a risk that adjudications
with respect to individual members of the class would practically im-
pair the rights of absent class members.122 The court reasoned that
if a liquidation of the company became necessary, absent class mem-
bers might be foreclosed from making future claims against the as-
sets of the company.123 Further, the court pointed out that the
construction which it gave to the related bond indenture would be
adhered to in any subsequent suits by absent class members.124 As
such, the court believed that all of the bondholders should be repre-
sented in the initial action.125
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) actions are usually certified as mandatory class
actions.126 Additionally, just as aggregation of claims is allowed in
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) actions, each individual class member in a Rule
23(b)(1)(B) action need not meet the amount in controversy require-
ments normally imposed in federal diversity suits.127
E. Rule 23(b)(2) Actions: Actions for Injunctive or Declaratory
Relief
If "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class" such that final injunctive
or declaratory relief would be an appropriate request, the action can
be maintained as a Rule 23(b)(2) class action.128 This type of class ac-
tion generally involves broad constitutional, statutory, or public pol-
120. Eliasen v. Green Bay & W.R.R. Co., 93 F.R.D. 408, 413 (E.D. Wis. 1982). See
also Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) (described by the Rules
Advisory Committee as an action by policyholders against a fraternal benefit associa-
tion attacking a financial reorganization where "it would hardly have been practical, if
indeed it would have been possible, to confine the effects of a validation of the reor-
ganization to the individual plaintiffs." Advisory Note, supra note 97, at 101.)
121. 93 F.R.D. 408 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
122. Id. at 412.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 413. This is because, as the court noted, corporations have a duty to treat
all members of a class of bondholders equally. Id.
125. Id
126. Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295, 300 (E.D. La. 1970).
127. Gallagher v. Continental Ins. Co., 502 F.2d 827, 831 (10th Cir. 1974).
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
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icy issues 29 and is particularly suited to civil rights cases. 130 For
example, a typical Rule 23(b)(2) action might involve allegations of
classwide discrimination that would be subject to a single injunctive
remedy.13 1
However, Rule 23(b)(2) actions are not limited to civil rights
cases.
1 3 2 Rule 23(b)(2) is applicable in any action where the party op-
posing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally ap-
plicable to the class and, therefore, is particularly applicable to
actions by security holders that seek injunctive or declaratory relief.
Accordingly, in Sharon Steel Corporation v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A.,133 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals approved the certifica-
tion of an action involving the default of a class of bonds as a Rule
23(b)(2) class action. 3 4 In that case, two corporations merged, and
the debenture holders sought a ruling to declare that the liquidating
corporation was in default on the bonds and that it remained respon-
sible for their payment.135
As with actions brought under Rule 23(b)(1), Rule 23(b)(2) actions
are typically certified as mandatory class actions.136 Likewise, aggre-
gation of claims to satisfy federal jurisdictional requirements is nor-
mally permitted in Rule 23(b)(2) actions since class members in those
actions unite to enforce a single claim against the party opposing the
class, and the opposing party's conduct relates to the class as a
whole.13 7 For example, in an action where a bondholder brought suit
129. 6A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, L. ED. § 12:191 (1989). Rule 23(b)(2) actions can be
distinguished from Rule 23(b)(3) actions in that the latter usually involve common
damage claims or other property interests, which is typical of mass tort cases. Id. Ad-
ditionally, Rule 23(b)(2) is inapplicable to suits where money damages are the primary
relief requested. Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1314 (9th Cir.
1977).
130. Redhail v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (E.D. Wis. 1976), affd, 434 U.S. 374
(1978).
131. Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 524 (6th Cir. 1976); cert. denied,
429 U.S. 870 (1976).
132. Advisory Note, supra note 97, at 102. See also Brandt v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 62
F.R.D. 160, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (stating that there is "nothing in the language or the
use of the rule that suggests its utility is limited to [civil rights actions]").
133. 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983).
134. Id. at 1047.
135. Id. See also Brandt, 62 F.R.D. 160 (class action by holders of preferred stock);
Broenen v. Beaunit Corp., 305 F. Supp. 688, affd, 440 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1970) (class
action by holders of bonds).
136. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 248 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011 (1975).
137. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969) (holding that when claims are
"joint and common," they are entitled to aggregation).
over amounts due under a class of delinquent paving bonds, the court
permitted aggregation of the bondholder class members' claims. 138
Similarly, another court allowed aggregation of the claims of a corpo-
ration's preferred shareholders under a Rule 10b-5 claim brought as a
Rule 23(b)(2) class action because any decision on the issue of the
corporation's liability would affect all preferred shareholders
equally.139
Where an action qualifies as a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) or a Rule 23(b)(2)
action, it will also qualify for certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which
has less rigorous standards for qualification.140 Initially, this fact
may seem to pose an obstacle to the certification of a mandatory class
action, since Rule 23(b)(3) actions must include a provision which al-
lows class members to opt out of the action. 14 1 However, it is an es-
tablished principle that when an action qualifies under either Rule
23(b)(1) or (2) and Rule 23(b)(3), the action should always be certi-
fied under 23(b)(1) or (2).142 The reason is that the binding effect of
a judgment or settlement rendered in a Rule 23(b)(1) or (2) action is
preferable to the optionally binding effect rendered in a Rule
23(b)(3) action. 143 Further, in order to support the policies behind
the class action rule, separate lawsuits are to be avoided whenever
possible, and opt out provisions under Rule 23(b)(3) allow for the un-
desirable result of multiple suits.144
F. Rule 23(b)(3) Actions: Common Questions of Law or Fact
Class actions are commonly certified as Rule 23(b)(3) actions when
"class action treatment is not as clearly called for as in [Rule]
23(b)(1) or [Rule] 23(b)(2)" situations, but the facts of the case still
support maintaining a class action rather than individual lawsuits.145
Rule 23(b)(3) prevents multiple litigation of similar factual and legal
issues and, therefore, saves judicial time and legal expenses. 146
138. Cahill v. Hovenden, 132 F.2d 422, 425 (10th Cir. 1942).
139. Brandt, 62 F.R.D. at 169. See also Broenen, 305 F. Supp. at 692 (where suit was
brought by a class of bondholders, and the court allowed aggregation, noting that
"[elach member of the proposed class claims all his rights in the debentures through
the same trust indenture. Allegedly, a single transaction involving all of the defend-
ants to this action violated the term of the trust indenture, thereby damaging all mem-
bers of the proposed class equally ....").
140. Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
142. Van Gemert, 259 F. Supp. at 130.
143. Wetzel, 508 F.2d at 253.
144. Van Gemert, 259 F. Supp. at 130-31.
145. 6A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, L. ED. § 12:207 (1989); Advisory Note, supra note 97,
at 102. The courts give preference to certification under Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2)
where the requirements of those subdivisions are met, even though the requirements
specified in Rule 23(b)(3) are also met. Wetzel, 508 F.2d at 253.
146. Advisory Note, supra note 97, at 102-03.
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In order to certify an action under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must
find that "the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."'147 Since Rule
23(b)(3) actions are particularly appropriate when the action is
brought exclusively or primarily to recover money damages,148 cir-
cumstances supporting a certification under Rule 23(b)(3) often exist
in mass tort cases.149 For instance, a district court certified a class
under Rule 23(b)(3) for purposes of determining liability in a massive
class action against the manufacturer of "Agent Orange."' 50
Class actions pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) must provide notice con-
taining an opt out provision to all potential class members, thus al-
lowing members to choose whether they want to be bound by the
subsequent judgment or settlement.' 5 ' Due to this this opt out re-
quirement, certification under Rule 23(b)(3) would not benefit bond-
holders using the class action device as a restructuring technique,
since individual bondholders could choose whether they wished to be
bound by the settlement. Also, the corporation would be open to sep-
arate suits by individual bondholders who chose not to participate in
the initial action.
Further, aggregation of claims is not allowed under Rule 23(b)(3)
and each class member must individually satisfy the $50,000 amount
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Four factors are important in making this finding:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prose-
cution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litiga-
tion concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of
the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claims in the particular forum; [and] (D) the difficulties likely to be en-
countered in the management of a class action.
Id.
148. Eley v. Morris, 390 F. Supp. 913, 918 (N.D. Ga. 1975). "Thus, a suit is maintain-
able as a class action under FRCP 23(b)(3), rather than FRCP 23(b)(1) or FRCP
23(b)(2), where the recovery of damages appears to be the predominant consideration,
even though injunctive relief is also sought." 6A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, L. ED. § 12:209
(1989). Cf supra sections IIl(C), III(D) and III(E) regarding Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule
23(b)(2) actions.
149. In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 724 (W.D. Mo. 1985). Liability and
causation are common issues in Rule 23(b)(3) actions based on tort claims. Sterling v.
Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988). The individual issues of
damages as to each class member are reserved for treatment following the class action
on the liability issue. See id.
150. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 166-67 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
151. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). Cf. supra sections III(C), III(D) and III(E) regarding
actions brought under Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2).
in controversy requirement. 5 2 This is because Rule 23(b)(3) actions
commonly involve plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims. 5 3
G. Mandatory Class Actions After Shutts
In Shutts,154 the United States Supreme Court ruled on a number
of personal jurisdiction and choice of law issues in a multistate class
action commenced in Kansas state court where the plaintiff sought to
recover interest on delayed royalty payments. 15 5 The Supreme Court
held that the application of Kansas substantive law to all claims,
when ninety-nine percent of the underlying gas leases and ninety-
seven percent of the class members had no connection to Kansas, was
"sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional lim-
its."156 The Supreme Court also held that, in addition to receiving
proper notice157 and adequate representation by the named par-
ties, 58 minimum due process requires that absent class members be
afforded the right to exclude themselves from the suit in a multistate
class action seeking predominately money damages.15 9
152. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 292 .(1973). Of course, the
amount in controversy requirements imposed by 28 U.S.C., section 1332, would not be a
bar to federal court access where jurisdiction was based upon a federal question, such
as a violation of federal securities laws. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1991).
153. See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 296, 301.
154. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
155. See John E. Kennedy, The Supreme Court Meets the Bride of Frankenstein:
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts and the State Multistate Class Action, 34 KAN. L. REV.
255 (1985).
156. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822.
157. Id. at 812. (stating that "(t]he notice must be the best practicable, 'reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.' ") (quoting Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950)).
158. Id. (holding that "the Due Process Clause of course requires that the named
plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class members")
(citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940)).
159. Id. "Additionally, we hold that due process requires at a minimum that an ab-
sent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by ex-
ecuting and returning an 'opt out' or 'request for exclusion' form to the court." Id.
However, the Supreme Court specifically held that due process does not require that
nonresident claimants "opt in" to the class. Id.
Shutts is significant because it is the first Supreme Court pronouncement concerning
the effect of due process requirements on mandatory class actions. Prior to Shutts, a
majority of federal courts accepted the principle that class members in Rule 23(b)(1)
or Rule 23(b)(2) actions cannot opt out. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239
(3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses
Ass'n v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636, 642 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
993 (1974). However, a minority of federal courts believed that it was within their dis-
cretion to permit members of such classes to opt out. See, e.g., Bauman v. United
States Dist. Ct., 557 F.2d 650, 659 (9th Cir. 1977) (ruling that order requiring that notice
of right to opt out be sent to members of a Rule 23(b)(2) class is not "clearly errone-
ous"); Elliott v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 413 U.S. 816
(1978), affid in part and rev'd in part, 422 U.S. 682 (1979) (holding that Rule 23(d)(2)
makes notice discretionary with the court in Rule 23(b)(2) actions). While the Ninth
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The Shutts court specifically limited its holding to class actions
wholly or predominately for money damages. The Supreme Court
stated: "Our holding today is limited to those class actions which seek
to bind known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predominately
for money judgements. We intimate no view concerning other types
of class actions, such as those seeking equitable relief."1 0
While this language is consistent with the well-accepted position
that Rule 23(b)(2) actions, which by definition are actions primarily
for equitable relief, do not require opt-out rights, there is considera-
ble controversy regarding the effect of Shutts on mandatory class ac-
tions under Rule 23(b)(1), which may involve claims for monetary
damages. Professor Miller, who argued the case on behalf of Phillips
Petroleum, stated that one way to view Shutts is as a case concerned
primarily with distant forum abuse. 161 Viewed as such, the right to
opt out is essential to the validation of jurisdiction over class mem-
bers who have no affiliation with the distant forum. 6 2 In cases
where there are no concerns over the reach of a distant court or the
application of inapplicable law, Shutts does not require that class
members be permitted to opt out.163
Another leading commentator believes that most actions under
Rule 23(b)(1) are excluded from the reach of Shutts because such
suits "predominately (but not exclusively) involve suits seeking equi-
table relief."l6 4 According to Mr. Newberg:
Classes certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) seek to have unitary adjudication of
Circuit Court of Appeals adhered to this minority view, district courts within the
Ninth Circuit held that the right to opt out is not "a requirement of due process" in
class actions other than under Rule 23(b)(3). See, e.g., Wofford v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
78 F.R.D. 460, 493 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
160. Phillips, 472 U.S. at 811 n.3.
161. Miller & Crump, supra note 14, at 38, 52.
162. Id.
163. To illustrate this point, Professor Miller contrasted the "unified mass disaster"
in the Kansas City Hyatt Hotel that was the basis for the class action in In re Federal
Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982)
(mandatory certification upheld) with the nationwide product liability claims of In re
Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig. 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983) (mandatory certification denied). According to
Professor Miller, a unified mass disaster, such as in Skywalk probably "has the requi-
site nexus to support mandatory certification at the site of the disaster" after Shutts,
but mandatory certification may not be appropriate in a "nationwide product[s] liabil-
ity action for claims for other dispersed torts" such as in Dalkon Shield. Miller &
Crump, supra note 14, at 38, 52-53. But see In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (mandatory certification upheld in nationwide products
liability action).
164. 1 NEWBERG, supra note 100, § 1.14, at 9-10 (Supp. 1991).
the controversy affecting a class in order to avoid the risk of incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class. This subsection, which
normally deals with a joint right or obligation, includes equitable class actions
for mandatory injunctive or declaratory relief such as suits to declare a corpo-
rate dividend, or to define riparian rights .... Finally, actions by or against
similarly-situated persons to allocate pro rata an available fund that is insuffi-
cient to pay all claims, such as those found with respect to interpleader suits,
creditor claims in bankruptcy, or actions under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), are equitable
in nature, although they involve money claims individually. 1 6 5
Although Shutts has left open "fascinating and knotty ques-
tions"166 about mandatory class actions, most actions brought by se-
curity holders to restructure debt securities should be unaffected by
Shutts. First, most of these class actions involve claims arising under
an indenture or other instrument governed by the laws of a single
state or are brought pursuant to the federal securities laws. As a re-
sult, such actions are unlikely to raise the troubling questions of per-
sonal jurisdiction considered in Shutts. Second, these actions, which
would most likely seek to require the issuer to issue a new package
of securities in exchange for the existing securities, would be actions
for injunctive or declaratory relief, rather than for monetary dam-
ages, and would not be affected by Shutts's opt-out requirements.
H. Cass Action Settlements
1. In General
A class action under Rule 23 cannot be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court.16 7 This requirement protects ab-
sent class members in mandatory class actions and in permissive class
actions where a class member has not exercised his right to opt
out.16 8
165. Id. at 10. (footnotes omitted.)
166. Miller & Crump, supra note 14, at 57.
167. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Court approval of a class action settlement will be re-
versed on appeal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Girsch
v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 1975).
168. Jenson v. Continental Fin. Corp., 591 F.2d 477, 482 n.7 (8th Cir. 1979). Absent
class members' interests need protection because it is very possible, within the dynam-
ics of class action litigation, that the interests of the absent class members and the
class representatives will conflict during settlement negotiations. Sylvia R. Lazos,
Note, Abuse in Plainttff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian During
Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REV. 308, 312-14 (1985). This is because
the class representatives have a strong incentive to settle to avoid the burdensome
costs of litigation which are imposed upon them, while the absent class members' in-
terests are to recover the largest award possible, which may only be attainable after a
trial. Id. At the same time, the party opposing the class will possess a strong motiva-
tion to settle in order to avoid adverse publicity and a potentially high damage award.
J. Spencer Schuster, Precertification Settlement of Class Actions: Will California Fol-
low the Federal Lead?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 863, 865 (1989). Thus, the approval of the tria
court is necessary to avoid the impairment of the absent class members' interests. Id.
at 871.
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2. Classwide Settlement Reached Prior to Filing Class Action
Suit
Rule 23 does not prohibit the certification of a class action filed af-
ter a settlement agreement has been reached between putative class
representatives and the defendant.16 9 One commentator has stated:
"Settlement agreements between parties with adverse interests con-
cluded before the the initiation of a lawsuit may consitute the basis of
a classwide judicial decree after legal proceedings have begun."170 In
Continental Assurance Co. v. Macleod-Stedman, Inc.,171 the finan-
cially troubled issuer of $30 million of mortgage notes notified the
registered holders of its failure to make an interest payment on the
notes and of its efforts to improve its business prospects.172 Some
months later, "after extensive and complicated negotiations," the is-
suer and representatives of the holders of the notes reached an
agreement, which was submitted to all registered noteholders for
their consent. 173 After the agreement was approved by a "substantial
majority" of the note holders, the representatives of the holders filed
a class action lawsuit seeking certification of a mandatory class in or-
der to obtain unanimous participation in the settlement.174 While the
court declined to certify the class because of concerns that such a cer-
tification would violate provisions of the related indenture and the
Trust Indenture Act,175 it did not indicate that this procedure vio-
lated the provisions of Rule 23. A similar procedure was followed in
MBank Dallas v. LaBarge, Inc.,176 in which a proposed settlement be-
tween the issuer and the indenture trustee (on behalf of the bond-
holders) was reached prior to the filing of the class action lawsuit.177
3. Classwide Settlement Reached After Class Action Filing But
Before Certification of Class
When a settlement is reached after the class action complaint has
169. Such a procedure is likely to result in a greater degree of scrutiny for collu-
sion. See infra Section III(I).
170. 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.21, at 417 (2d ed.
1985).
171. 449 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
172. Id. at 452.
173. Id. at 453-51.
174. Id. at 454.
175. We believe that this conclusion was not warranted. See infra Section IV.
176. No. 86 C 9583 (N.D. Ill. December 29, 1986) (unpublished findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and final order).
177. Id. at 6.
been filed but before the class has been certified by the court, the set-
tlement is treated like a class action settlement in a majority of fed-
eral courts-that is, notice and court approval are required. 178
However, since notice cannot normally be given until the class mem-
bers are determined and the class is certified, the strategic and tim-
ing advantages of this approach are diminished unless the court
permits the certification of a temporary settlement class in order to
facilitate notice requirement.179 Under this procedure, the settle-
ment fairness hearing may occur prior to the actual certification,
which may occur simultaneously with approval of the settlement.1 80
Generally, a court will pay special attention to whether a precer-
tification settlement might have been influenced by fraud or collu-
sion and whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonablel 8
in light of all the class members' interests.18 2
178. See, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 326
(E.D. Pa. 1967). The primary concerns are with precertification settlements made on
an individual, as opposed to a classwide, basis. In the case of individual settlements,
the putative class members, relying upon the filing of the class action, may forfeit their
rights by foregoing individual actions and such settlements may be "an impermissible
abuse of the class action device... [since] the defendants might well be willing to pay
the named plaintiffs a premium for the elimination of the class, a premium to which
they are, of course, not entitled." Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481, 483 (N.D.
Ill. 1970).
There is a split of authority on this point, however. Some federal courts take the
view that Federal Rule 23(e) is inapplicable to precertification settlements. See, e.g.,
Weight Watchers of Phila., Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 775 (2d Cir.
1972) (holding that Rule 23(e) "does not bar non-approved settlements with individual
members [of the putative class] which have no effect upon the rights of others"). A
separate, emerging minority of federal courts requires judicial approval of class action
settlements, but does not require notice of the settlement to go out to all class mem-
bers. Schuster, supra note 168, at 873.
179. 2 NEWBERG, supra note 170, § 11.27, at 425. This procedure is controversial and
was criticized in the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.46 (5th ed. 1982). However,
the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION SECOND § 30.45 (1985) recognizes that courts
have permitted the use of settlement classes, although it suggests that this has oc-
curred "with great caution." Id.
180. County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1422 (E.D.N.Y.
1989), offd in part, 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990).
181. This determination requires the trial court to decide "whether the interests of
the class as a whole are better served if the litigation is resolved by the settlement
rather than pursued." 6A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, L. ED. § 12:359 (1989) (footnote omit-
ted). See, e.g., Weinberg v. Lear Fan Corp., 627 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating
that where a settlement has been negotiated before the class has been certified, the
court should scrutinize the fairness of the settlement with even more care than usual).
182. Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 833 (3d Cir. 1973). Generally,
the fact that the settlement was reached prior to class certification is only one factor
weighing against approval of the settlement, and the court will normally approve the
settlement where there are other factors indicating that the settlement is fair, ade-
quate, and reasonable. Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 91 F.R.D. 434, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
aff'd, 688 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1982).
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4. Criteria for Court Approval of a Settlement
When a proposed classwide settlement is reached, it must be sub-
mitted to the court for approval.183 Then, the court must notify the
class of the proposed settlement and afford absent class members an
opportunity to object at a scheduled hearing.18 4 Although Rule 23
does not specify what criteria a court should employ to approve a set-
tlement, commentators agree that a settlement should be approved if
it is "fair, adequate and reasonable."18 5
With respect to this determination of fairness, the United States
Supreme Court has stated: "Courts judge the fairness of a proposed
compromise by weighing the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the
merits against the amount and form of the relief offered in the settle-
ment .... They do not decide the merits of the case or resolve unset-
tled legal questions."' 8 6
After surveying numerous cases describing different factors consid-
ered by courts in approving class action settlements, one commentor
attempted to list them:
For example, the following all have been viewed as relevant to approving a
dismissal or compromise: the likelihood of the class being successful in the lit-
igation, the points of law on which the settlement is based, the amount pro-
posed as compared to the amount that might be recovered, less litigation costs
if the action went forward, the plan for distributing the settlement, whether
proper procedures were adopted for giving notice to members of the class, and
whether the settlement would waive other viable claims.1 8 7
I. Challenge to Settlement of Class Actions on Grounds of
Collusion
Under certain circumstances, a bondholder class action brought to
183. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) provides: "A class action shall not be dismissed or com-
promised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court
directs."
184. Advisory Note, supra note 97, at 104.
185. See, e.g., 3]3 JAMES MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.80[4), at 23-488
(2d ed. 1991) (stating that "The burden is on the proponents of a settlement to per-
suade the court that it is fair, adequate and reasonable."); 2 NEWBERG, supra note 170,
§ 11.40, at 452 (stating that "[o]verall, the court has the duty to determine whether the
settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate."); 7B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1797.1, at 378 (1986) (stating that "[iun
general, the standard used by the courts in evaluating a compromise is that the propo-
sal must be fair and reasonable and in the best interests of all those who will be af-
fected by it.").
186. Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981) (citation omitted).
187. 7B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D
§ 1797.1, at 395-404 (1986).
restructure debt securities may be subject to scrutiny on the grounds
that it is collusive. This challenge would be based upon the fourth
prerequisite to class action certification contained in Rule 23(a)-that
the representative party must adequately protect the interests of the
class.188 For example, the payment by one side in an action of an op-
posing counsel's legal fees is generally an indicator of collusion.189
However, while such payments may be indicators of collusion, they
are not always regarded as conclusive. For example, in Cranston v.
Freeman,190 a group of dairy farmers brought a class action against
the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and other dairy farmers seeking re-
lief from certain milk pricing differentials. 191 The Consolidated Milk
Producers Association solicited the plaintiffs who brought the action
and agreed to pay their counsel fees. Significantly, a majority of the
Association's members belonged to the group of dairy farmers which
made up the defendant class in the suit. The Association's interest in
encouraging the suit was to clear up the uncertainty regarding the
validity of the pricing differentials which benefitted the defendant
class.
Following a motion by certain members of the plaintiffs' class to
dismiss the suit because of alleged collusion between the defendants
and representatives of the plaintiff class, the District Court in Cran-
ston reaffirmed the certification of the class action and refused to dis-
miss the suit.192 The court reasoned that, although the Association
had contributed to the plaintiffs' counsel fees, neither the Association
nor the defendants ever attempted to control the plaintiffs' conduct
during the suit.193 Further, the court noted that the plaintiffs' attor-
ney had vigorously advocated on behalf of the plaintiff class.194 Since
there had been no attempt by the Association to control the plain-
tiffs' prosecution of the suit and because the proceedings were con-
ducted in "an adversary nature on the highest level," the class
certification was upheld.195
Likewise, in Wiley v. Western Airlines,196 the court upheld a set-
tlement agreement between two opposing parties to a class action de-
spite allegations of collusion. 197 In that case, certain plaintiffs who
188. See supra Section III(A).
189. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (dismissing a suit on collu-
sion grounds where defendant paid plaintiff's counsel fees and where plaintiff exer-
cised no control over the suit).
190. 290 F. Supp. 785 (N.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Cranston v.
Hardin, 428 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971).
191. Id. at 786-87.
192. Id. at 788.
193. Id. at 789.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Nos. 89-16141, 89-16142, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 8239 (9th Cir. Apr. 15, 1991).
197. Id. at *16.
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opposed the settlement agreement alleged that counsel for the plain-
tiff class had reached a collusive agreement with the defendant. The
court in Wiley stated that, in order to overcome a collusion challenge
to the class action settlement, the settlement must appear "fair, rea-
sonable, and adequate to all concerned." 198  As in Cranston, the
court noted that the plaintiffs' attorney had "competently and vigor-
ously" advocated on behalf of the plaintiffs during settlement negoti-
ations and that anything the plaintiffs had conceded was "done 'in
the spirit of compromise that is necessary to achieve any settle-
ment.'"199 The court also concluded that the agreement was "ade-
quate and fair" to all parties concerned, even though a minority of
the class members did not approve of the settlement.200
Based upon the above analysis, it appears that bondholders seeking
to restructure their bonds through bondholder litigation and settle-
ment may seek reinbrusement of the representatives' litigation ex-
penses and still avoid a potential collusion challenge. So long as the
interests of the plaintiff class are vigorously advocated, an allegation
of collusion is not likely to succeed. Further, if the settlement in-
volves a Section 3(a)(10)20 1 exchange of securities, the court must
necessarily determine in a fairness hearing that the settlement is fair
to all members of the class of bondholders.202
IV. DOES THE TRUST INDENTURE ACT PERMIT A MANDATORY
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT?
A. Background of Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act
Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act, originally enacted in
1939, prohibits the impairment of the right of a bondholder to receive
payment of the principal and interest on a debt security issued under
a qualified indenture without the consent of the bondholder.203 Sec-
198. Id. at *11.
199. Id. at *13-14 (citing the district court's order).
200. Id. at *9.
201. See infra Section V regarding the use of the Section (3)(a)(10) exchange ex-
emption in conjunction with the issuance of securities in the settlement of bondholder
litigation.
202. See infra Section V(B)(3).
203. The text of Section 316(b) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision thereof, the indenture to be qualified
shall provide that, the right of any holder of any indenture security to receive
payment of the principal of and interest on such indenture security.., or to
institute suit for the enforcement of any such payment on or after such re-
spective dates, shall not be impaired or affected without the consent of such
holder, except as to a postponement of an interest payment consented to as
tion 316(b) effectively prohibits modification of fundamental payment
terms through the use of majority action provisions-provisions
which, though rare in 1939 in American indentures because of con-
cerns about their effect on negotiability, were quite common in Cana-
dian and English indentures. 20 4
The legislative history of the Trust Indenture Act indicates that
Congress enacted Section 316(b)'s prohibition to avoid "[elvasion of
judicial scrutiny of the fairness of debt-readjustment plans ... "205
to preserve negotiability and to assure that such securities were legal
investments for certain financial institutions.206 In his testimony
before Congress on the bill, William 0. Douglas, then Chairman of
the SEC, downplayed the effect of Section 316(b), characterizing criti-
cism of the prohibition as "somewhat of a bogey" and stating that the
prohibition "merely restricts the power of the majority to change ...
particular phases of the contract." 207
In fact, the prohibition against majority action was a deliberate
strategy by Douglas and others at the SEC to compel judicial supervi-
sion of workouts and reorganizations. The SEC's extensive 5000-page
study of corporate reorganizations, 208 which served as the legislative
basis for the Trust Indenture Act, contained numerous examples of
the dangers of out-of-court reorganizations and judicially-supervised
reorganizations that did not provide adequate protection for minority
security holders. While the majority action prohibition was clearly
provided in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) and except that such indenture
may contain provisions limiting or denying the right of any such holder to
institute any such suit, if and to the extent that the institution or prosecution
thereof or the entry of judgment therein would, under the applicable law, re-
sult in the surrender, impairment, waiver, or loss of the lien of such indenture
upon any property subject to such lien.
15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (1988). It is important to note that the requirements of Section
316(b) do not apply to bond issuances where the indenture limits the aggregate princi-
pal amount to $10,000,000. 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(a)(9) (1988).
204. Francis L. Stetson et al., Preparation of Corporate Bonds, Mortgages, Collateral
Trusts and Debenture Indentures, in SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING,
REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 1, 68 (1922); De Forest Billyou, Corporate Mortgage
Bonds and Majority Clauses, 57 YALE L.J. 595, 595-97 (1948).
205. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, REPORT ON TRUST INDENTURE
ACT OF 1939, S. REP. No. 248, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. 26 (1939) (emphasis added) [herein-
after SENATE REPORT]; HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON IN-
TERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess.
35 (1938) (testimony of William 0. Douglas).
206. SENATE REPORT, supra note 205, at 27 (reporting that "[iln many States it is
necessary in order to preserve the negotiability of the notes or bonds; in others it is
necessary if the notes or bonds are to be legal investments for insurance companies,
savings banks, and the like.").
207. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, House of Representatives, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 35 (1938) (emphasis added).
208. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTI-
GATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND RE-
ORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (1937).
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intended to foster judicial supervision of corporate reorganizations,
the SEC report, like the congressional reports, did not necessarily
favor bankruptcy courts over other courts or agencies. For example,
after surveying a number of contractual approaches, such as majority
action provisions that facilitated "voluntary reorganizations," the
SEC study concluded: "The risk is that if these provisions come into
vogue and no controls are set up over them, the next cycle of reorga-
nizations will take place on a voluntary basis without supervision of
any court or administrative agency."20 9 Similarly, the SEC study
acknowledged that until the then-recent revisions of the Bankruptcy
Act, "the favored method for effecting a corporate reorganization was
through the federal consent receivership." 210 In fact, the SEC report
noted that bankruptcy proceedings are more susceptible than receiv-
ership proceedings to manipulation by "management and its
bankers."211
Thus, while the background and the legislative history of the ma-
jority action prohibition in Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act
indicate legislative intent to promote judicial supervision of corporate
restructurings, there is no evidence that the judicial supervision in-
tended was to be provided by a bankruptcy court instead of any other
court or adminstrative agency.
B. Recent Cases
Recent courts have puzzled over the question of whether they have
the judicial power, through use of a mandatory class action lawsuit,
to require nonassenting bondholders to participate in a lawsuit settle-
ment that compromises the original payment terms of the bonds. For
example, in the Continental Assurance case,212 the financially trou-
bled issuer of $30 million of mortgage notes, after defaulting on an
interest payment, sent a notice to all noteholders inviting them to
meet with the issuer for the purpose of discussing various restructur-
ing proposals.
After an initial meeting on April 8, 1987, a preliminary agreement
regarding the terms of a restructuring was reached on April 15, 1987
and was reflected in a "term sheet." 213 On September 8, 1987, the is-
209. Id. at 150 (emphasis added).
210. Id. at 869.
211. Id. at 871.
212. Continental Assurance Co. v. MacLeod-Stedman, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 449 (N.D.
Ill. 1988).
213. Id. at 453.
suer, the indenture trustee and certain noteholders signed a defini-
tive settlement agreement, which was then submitted to
noteholders.214 On November 16, 1987, after holders of eighty-nine
percent of noteholders had agreed in principle to the settlement, a
representative of the noteholders filed a class action lawsuit against
the issuer in federal district court. The representative sought a fair-
ness hearing in order to perfect the exemption under Section 3(a)(10)
of the Securities Act and certification of a "no opt out class as a
means of avoiding any requirement of consent mandated by the In-
denture or the [Trust Indenture Act]."215
In its subsequent recitation of facts, the court stated: "Without is-
suing an opinion or ruling on class certification, [this] court indi-
cated its conclusion that the Indenture and the TIA required that any
Noteholder who was part of the settlement had to consent to it and
that class certification could not be used to avoid this require-
ment."216 As a result of this conclusion, the legal issue presented was
never pursued; plaintiff withdrew its request for class certification
and was able to obtain 100% participation in the restructuring agree-
ment by arranging for one of the participating noteholders to buy the
notes of the holdout noteholders.2 17
The court's hesitation in Continental Assurance seems unfounded
in light of earlier and later cases in the same federal district in which
courts certified mandatory classes in similar situations. In MBank
Dallas v. LaBarge, Inc.,218 the issuer of $10 million of debentures de-
faulted on an interest payment due on October 15, 1986.219 The
trustee held a bondholders meeting on November 6, 1986 and by De-
cember 7, 1986 had reached a tentative agreement with the issuer
with respect to terms of a restructuring of the debentures.220 There-
after, the trustee filed the class action, attaching the settlement
agreement to the complaint.221 On December 12, 1986, the court cer-
tified the action as a mandatory class action under Rules 23(b)(1)(A)
and (B) and (b)(2), approved a notice to class members and scheduled
a fairness hearing, which was held on December 29, 1986.222 Among
other things, the notice stated that the settlement order "will be a fi-
nal and binding resolution of all rights and interests of all Deben-
214. Id. at 453-54.
215. Id. at 455.
216. Id. (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 456.
218. No. 86 C 9583 (N.D. Ill. December 29, 1986) (unpublished findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and final order).
219. Id. at 3.
220. Id. at 6.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 3.
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tureholders."223  At such hearing, the court approved the
restructuring embodied in the class action settlement and ruled spe-
cifically that the holders of the debentures "have not been deprived
of their right to sue for principal and interest on the Debentures
within the meaning of Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act."22 4
Similarly, a court in a later case in the same federal district certi-
fied a mandatory class in a debt restructuring. After experiencing se-
vere financial difficulties starting in the mid-1980s because of
deteriorating real estate values in Texas, Las Colinas Corporation, a
land development company, began a protracted effort to restructure
its debt, culminating in a registered exchange offer and prepackaged
Chapter 11 plan solicitation that was launched on May 23, 1989 and
completed on June 22, 1989.225
In October 1988, Kemper Investors Life Insurance Company, one
of the holders of the $200 million of twelve and a half percent First
Mortgage Notes that was subject to the exchange offer, had filed a
class action lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois alleging,
among other things, breach of provisions of the indenture. Prior to
the commencement of the exchange offer, the court certified the law-
suit as a mandatory class action.226 On June 5, 1989, Kemper and
the issuer filed a joint motion for approval of the class action settle-
ment, and the court thereafter directed that Kemper provide notice
of the proposed settlement to all noteholders. 227 The settlement pro-
vided for the exchange of the notes for the same consideration and
on the same terms as provided in the simultaneous exchange offer,
except for certain minor changes to the new master note to be issued
in exchange. However, because the exchange was to be effectuated
as a settlement of a mandatory class action lawsuit, noteholders ef-
fectively lost their right not to participate in the exchange. In a Pro-
spectus Supplement dated June 7, 1989, the issuer warned:
Holders of Subordinated Notes should carefully review the Notice because the
Settlement, if approved by the Court, will require all holders of Subordinated
Notes to, among other things, accept the Exchange Offer, consent to the In-
denture/Mortgage Amendments and accept the Prepackaged Plan on terms
223. MBank Dallas v. LaBarge, Inc., No. 86 C 9583 at 9 (N.D. Ill. December 12,
1986) (unpublished notice to debentureholders).
224. MBank Dallas v. LaBarge, Inc., No. 86 C 9583 at 13 (N.D. Ill. December 29,
1986) (unpublished findings of fact, conclusions of law and final order).
225. See Prospectus filed on May 25, 1989 under Rule 424(b)(3) of the Securities Act
(SEC File No. 33-24488).
226. See Las Colinas, No. 88 C 9162 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 1989) (Exhibit A to Order Ap-
proving Notice, at 2).
227. 1&. (Order Approving Notice).
described in the Prospectus and Prospectus Supplement.2 2 8
The court held a hearing on the settlement on June 22, 1989, issued
findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order on June 27, 1989 that
approved the proposed settlement and issued a final order on July 24,
1989 that made the settlement binding upon all holders of the
notes.229
An interesting aspect of the class action settlement was its effect
on the prepackaged plan solicitation. Las Colinas solicited approvals
of a prepackaged plan simultaneously with its exchange offer as a
method of discouraging holdouts: if it received exchange offer ten-
ders and prepackaged plan acceptances that were less than its ninety-
five percent minimum exchange offer condition, but greater than the
sixty-six and two-thirds percent acceptance level required to approve
a prepackaged plan, it would file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and seek
to confirm the preapproved Chapter 11 plan that bound all notehold-
ers to the economic terms of the restructuring. Kemper preempted
this chancy strategy by having a federal district court assist the par-
ties in implementing a consensual restructuring without risking the
delay, expense and risk to the business that accompanies any Chapter
11 filing.
C. The Equitable Powers of a Federal Court in a Restructuring
1. Implementation by Federal Courts of Mandatory
Reorganizations Through Equity Receiverships
During the end of the last century and the beginning of this cen-
tury, many of this country's railroads and other corporations were re-
organized through the use of equitable receivers appointed by federal
courts without any resort to the federal bankruptcy statute.230 This
was due in part to the inadequacy of the federal bankruptcy laws,
which then "did not even attempt to deal with corporate reorganiza-
tions" and excluded railroads, banks, municipal corporations and in-
surance corporations.231
228. Las Colinas Corp., Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus, dated June 7, 1989,
and Solicitation of Indenture/Mortgage Amendment Consents and Prepackaged Plan
Acceptances, dated May 23, 1989, at 2 (SEC File No. 33-24488).
229. Kemper Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. Las Colinas Corp., No. 88 C 9162 (N.D. Ill. July 21,
1989) (order approving mandatory class action settlement that incorporated issuer's ex-
change offer).
230. For example, in 1916, receivers operated over 80 railroad corporations owning
42,000 miles of railroad, or about 16% of the total U.S. mileage. By 1925, 48 railroads
with over 18,000 miles of track were operated by receivers. See Robert T. Swaine, Re-
organization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade, 27 COLUM. L.
REV. 901, 901 (1927).
231. James N. Rosenberg, An Open Letter Containing Proposals for Amendment of
the Bankruptcy Act so as to Aid in Combating the Depression, 19 VA. L. REV. 333, 338
(1933).
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Equity receiverships, which were "largely judge-made, or, more ac-
curately, lawyer-made"232 legal creations, were designed to provide
financially troubled companies with sufficient time and protection
from their creditors so that they could reorganize in an orderly man-
ner. In a typical equity receivership, a financially troubled company,
in order to avoid a multiplicity of foreclosure actions and lawsuits by
creditors, arranged for a friendly creditor located in a different juris-
diction to file a creditor's bill in federal court in the jurisdiction of
the company's operations.233 This equitable action, which was called
a bill of peace-the forerunner to the modern class action law-
suit 234---sought relief in the form of equitable execution of the com-
pany's assets on behalf of all creditors similarly situated.235 After the
bill was filed, the corporation would answer, admit the allegations of
the bill, and consent to the appointment of receivers. 23 6
This procedure was cumbersome and expensive in situations where
the corporation's property was located in a number of different fed-
eral districts or circuits. In fact, in order to provide for an orderly
reorganization of a large corporation through equity receivers, it was
sometimes necessary to file "ancillary bills" in each federal district in
which a corporation's property was located.23 7 In one case involving
a chain store, some fifty local or ancillary receivers were ap-
pointed.238 In order to provide for coordination of these complex
legal proceedings, federal courts adopted the practice of designating
the initial court in which a creditor's bill was filed as the "'court of
primary jurisdiction' "239 However, this designation depended wholly
upon the "comity" or courtesy of the ancillary federal district
courts.
2 4 0
From this procedural "horror,"241 a series of judicial decisions were
delivered that defined the ability of a federal court, in the exercise of
232. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the
Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CH. L. REV. 738, 739 (1988).
233. Robert T. Swaine, Corporate Reorganization Under the Federal Bankruptcy
Power, 19 VA. L. REV. 317, 318-19 (1933). See also John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute
Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 970 (1989).
234. Miller & Crump, supra note 14, at 39 (stating that "[m]andatory classes find
historical precedent in the equitable bill of peace").
235. Swaine, supra note 233, at 319.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 320.
238. Rosenberg, supra note 231, at 338. See May Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. F. & W.
Grand 5-10-25 Cent Stores, Inc., 59 F.2d 218 (D. Mont. 1932).
239. Swaine, supra note 233, at 320.
240. Id. at 320.
241. Rosenberg, supra note 231, at 338 (stating that "[tihis horror-it is nothing
its equity powers, to bind nonassenting creditors to a reorganization
plan that impaired or compromised the debtor's obligations. The de-
velopment and recognition of this power is worth considering.
In the early cases, receivers were considered to have only the
power to hold and operate property and to sell it at the the most ad-
vantageous price. For example, in 1890, the Supreme Court in Knee-
land v. The American Loan & Trust Co.,242 expressed the narrow
view that "the appointment of a receiver vests in the court no abso-
lute control over the property, and no general authority to displace
vested contract liens."243
However, the power to enforce a creditor's bill through the conduct
of a judicial sale necessarily vested in federal judges considerable
power over the reorganization of insolvent entities. As one leading
commentator noted:
[A]II these proceedings looking toward an ultimate sale of the property must
proceed through determination of the validity and extent of each of the liens,
the identification of the property which it covers, the setting of a day for the
sale to occur, the determination whether there shall be an upset price and, if
so, in what amounts, the sale itself, and the ultimate confirmation of the sale
involving, under the present generally adopted practice, a judicial determina-
tion as to the equity of the plan pursuant to which the property has been
purchased.2 4 4
Most importantly, the power to conduct a judicial sale forced fed-
eral judges to administer the distribution of sale proceeds. In the fa-
mous reorganization case of Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd,245
the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, struck down a re-
organization conducted through a judicial sale that froze out an inter-
mediate class of creditors, while granting continued equity ownership
to preferred and common shareholders who contributed additional
money to the company.246 The decision strongly affirmed the "abso-
lute priority" rule. Notwithstanding its conclusion that such a plan
was invalid, the Supreme Court-in a famous dictum-noted:
This conclusion does not, as claimed, require the impossible, and make it nec-
essary to pay an unsecured crditor in cash as a condition of stockholders re-
taining an interest in the reorganized company. His interest can be preserved
by the issuance, on equitable terms, of income bonds or preferred stock. If he
declines a fair offer, he is left to protect himself as any other creditor of a
judgment debtor; and, having refused to come into a just reorganization, could
not thereafter be heard in a court of equity to attack it.2 4 7
This dictum paved the way for a series of decisions in which fed-
eral courts dispensed with the requirement that creditors are entitled
less-of the ancillary receivership eats into the very vitals of reorganization of our na-
tionwide enterprises, chain stores, railroads, etc. It must be stopped.").
242. 136 U.S. 89 (1890).
243. Id. at 97.
244. Swaine, supra note 233, at 323.
245. 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
246. Id. at 508.
247. Id.
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to the cash value of their interest in the debtor's property and the re-
quirement that there be a judicial sale at all.248 Some commentators
noted that the latter requirement had become "more of a fiction than
a fact" 249 since the sale was often not made to a real third party, but,
rather, to a group of existing creditors who bid their claims as consid-
eration and used the judicial sale as a method of eliminating or com-
promising the debt of other, more junior creditors.250
In Phipps v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway,2 51 for exam-
ple, the Eighth Circuit confirmed the decree of a federal district
court in a receivership proceeding, not involving a sale, in which all
creditors, including nonassenting creditors, were required to accept
new securities in the reorganized entity in exchange for their
claims.252 Citing the above-quoted dictum in Boyd, the Eighth Circuit
denied the right of nonassenting holders to receive the cash value of
their claims:
Mr. Phipps has been and still is offered the equivalent in the stock of the re-
organized company of his just share of the property of the insolvent company.
To sustain the contention of his counsel would result in his receiving the
whole amount of his claim against the insolvent company and interest upon it
in cash, while other creditors in his rank received only their just shares of
property in the stock of the reorganized company. The courts that adminis-
tered and distributed that property had and still have the same jurisdiction
and power to prevent so inequitable a result .... 253
In addition, the Eighth Circuit in Phipps dispensed with the re-
quirement of a judicial sale: "That in the foreclosure cases the courts
proceeded by sales . . .added nothing to the validity of or effect of
their decrees, or of the title they transferred to the purchasers." 254
Thus, in Phipps, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the power of a federal
district court, relying upon its equitable power of injunction, rather
than on the equitable doctrine of receivership and its "fiction" of ju-
dicial sale, to effectuate a nonbankruptcy reorganization in which
nonassenting creditors were compelled to relinquish their claims and
accept in exchange new equity securities in the reorganized entity.
The decision in Phipps, although controversial at the time,255 be-
248. See Swaine, supra note 233, at 324-27 (discussing decisions which dispensed
with these requirements).
249. Id, at 324.
250. Id,
251. 284 F. 945 (8th Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 762 (1923).
252. Id. at 953.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. For a contemporaneous criticism of the Phipps case, see Swaine, supra note
230, at 924-27.
came generally accepted. In Kansas City Terminal Railway v. Cen-
tral Union Trust Co.,256 for instance, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed a reorganization plan in a railroad receivership which
provided that all unsecured creditors would receive a package con-
sisting either of common and preferred stock or, for an additional
payment, mortgage bonds and common stock.257 In so doing, the
Supreme Court stated:
This doctrine [the absolute priority rule] is the "fixed principle" according to
which [Boyd] declares the character of reorganization agreements must be de-
termined, and to it there should be rigid adherence. But, as that opinion
states, this does not require the impossible, and make it necessary always to
pay unsecured creditors in cash before stockholders may retain any interest
whatever in the reorganized company. By way of illustration it further
pointed out, that such creditors can be protected "by the issuance, on equita-
ble terms, of income bonds or preferred stock." And we now add that, when
necessary, they may be protected through other arrangements, which dis-
tinctly recognize their equitable right to be preferred to stockholders .... 258
In 1934, Congress and the President enacted a bill that added Sec-
tion 77B to the Bankruptcy Act.2 59 Section 77B specifically provided
for corporate reorganizations and contained provisions permitting the
compromise of an entire class of claims with the assent of creditors
holding two-thirds in amount and a majority in number of the claims
if such reorganizations were determined to be "fair and equitable." 260
The usefulness of these provisions was considerably reduced by Jus-
tice Douglas's ruling in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.261
that the words "fair and equitable" required the individual consent of
each affected creditor to any deviations from the absolute priority
rule.262 Nevertheless, the new corporate reorganization provisions
reduced the need for the cumbersome and expensive receivership
procedures, and the elaborate judicially constructed receivership pro-
cedures fell into disuse. Even though dormant, however, no legisla-
tive action or other action was taken that affected or reduced the
scope of the equitable powers of federal courts charted during the
heyday of equity receiverships.
2. The Equitable Power of a Federal Court to Impair Claims of
Creditors Under Rule 23
Mandatory class action lawsuits under Rule 23 have their historical
origins in the same equitable bills of peace that served as the basis
256. 271 U.S. 445 (1926).
257. Id. at 454.
258. 1&
259. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911 (repealed by the Chandler Act,
ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938)).
260. § 77B; 48 Stat. at 918-19.
261. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
262. Id. at 114-18. For a criticism of this case, see Roe, supra note 37, at 253-56.
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for the equity receiverships in the early part of this century.263 In a
bill of peace, one person, called the adversary, might bring suit in eq-
uity against several persons, called the "multitude, with separate but
similar interests ... ."264 Alternatively, representatives of "the mul-
titude might sue to resolve in a single action common questions of
law or fact between the adversary and each member of the multi-
tude."265 Bills of peace were "especially desirable when the multi-
tude [was] seeking to divide a fund or a limited liability" where it was
"impossible to make a fair distribution of the fund or limited liability
to all members of the multitude except in a single proceeding where
the claim of each [could] be adjudicated with due reference to the
claims of the rest."266 Professor Chafee stated:
The fund or limited liability is like a mince pie, which can not be satisfactorily
divided until the carver counts the number of persons at the table .... The
problem is exactly like the distribution of the estate of a bankrupt, or an in-
solvent decedent or corporation, and similar to the administration in admi-
ralty of the limited liability of the owner of a lost vessel.
2 6 7
Because of the equitable origins of class actions, class actions for
damages at law were not permitted in England until the merger of
law and equity in 1873268 and were not permitted in the United
States until 1938, when law and equity were merged through the pro-
mulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.269 The Rules En-
abling Act, under which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
promulgated, specifically provides that "such rules shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right .... "270
In Brucker v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Europe N. Y,271 the plaintiffs,
dissenting members of a mandatory Rule 23 class action who alleged
that the conversion rights for an issue of convertible debentures had
been improperly destroyed in a merger, attacked a proposed class ac-
tion settlement as an improper use of Rule 23 since the settlement
263. 1 NEWBERG, supra note 100, § 1.10; Swaine, supra note 233, at 319 (remarking
that the creditor's bill brought to initiate an equity receivership "seeks such relief on
behalf of all creditors similarly situated, in the nature of a bill of peace to avoid multi-
plicity of actions.").
264. 1 NEWBERG, supra note 100, § 1.10 n.88.
265. Id. See generally, Zecharia Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1932); 1 JOHN N. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 246, at 467
(5th ed. 1941).
266. Chafee, supra note 265, at 1311.
267. Id. 1311-12.
268. 1 NEWBERG, supra note 100 § 1.10, at 17.
269. Id.
270. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (Supp. 1991).
271. 424 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd sub nom. Brucker v. Indian Head, 559
F.2d 1202 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 897 (1977).
abridged substantive contractual rights. In dismissing the claim, the
court in Brucker determined that the plaintiffs' substantive contrac-
tual rights had not been abridged and concluded that "the Rule 23
procedures have protected the substantive rights of the individual de-
benture holders."272  Nevertheless, the question remains whether a
Rule 23 mandatory class action in which nonassenting bondholders
are bound to a class-wide settlement providing for impairment of
their claims constitutes an abridgment of the holders' substantive
rights not to have their payment terms impaired without their indi-
vidual consent, as provided by Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture
Act.273
The impairment of creditor claims through settlement of a Rule 23
mandatory class action is an exercise of the equitable powers of a fed-
eral court that is conceptually and substantively indistinguishable
from the impairment of creditor claims in the Phipps equity receiver-
ship274 or the impairment of contractual insurance claims through an
equitable bill of peace in Ben-Hur.2 75 All three actions derive from
the inherent equitable powers of a federal court-substantive powers
that were not meant to be affected or limited through promulgation
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 276 The Phipps and Ben Hur
decisions demonstrate that federal courts possessed the inherent eq-
uitable power to compromise or impair claims of creditors prior to
the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There is
no basis for concluding that the exercise by a federal court of the
same remedy through the vehicle of a mandatory Rule 23 class action
settlement is limited in any way by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Moreover, the right of a creditor not to have its claim impaired was
not abridged by the promulgation of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or its use in effecting a binding settlement that im-
pairs the claims of nonassenting creditors; as Phipps demonstrates,
the rights of such creditors have always been subject to the equitable
remedies of a federal court, including the judicially enjoined restruc-
turing plans that impair the claims of nonassenting creditors.
Finally, the fact that the impairment prohibition is legally required
by the Trust Indenture Act, a statute enacted in 1939 following most
of the receivership cases, should not affect these conclusions. Section
272. Id. at 688.
273. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 316(b), 15 U.S.C. § 777ppp(b) (1988).
274. See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 99 & 120.
276. Fitzpatrick v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 1 F.R.D. 713 (D. N.J. 1941) (rul-
ing that while the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolish the procedural distinction
between actions at law and suits in equity, such rules are not meant to change or affect
the exercise of equitable remedies).
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316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act requires that a prohibition on im-
pairment without individual consent be part of every qualified inden-
ture.277 However, due to concerns about the effect of majority action
provisions on the negotiability of bonds, these prohibitions were a
part of almost all United States indentures prior to the enactment of
the Trust Indenture Act27 S--and such provisions did not limit the eq-
uitable powers of federal courts to bind nonassenting bondholders to
reorganization plans that impaired fundamental payment terms.
D. Constitutional Considerations
1. Contract Impairment Clause
Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution commands
that "No State shall ... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts." 27 9 The clause, which was a response to state debtor relief
laws enacted to combat the economic depression that preceded the
adoption of the Constitution, was "included primarily to protect pri-
vate contracts from improvident majoritarian impairment."28s Thus,
in Sturges v. Crowninshield,28 l the Supreme Court struck down New
York's insolvency law that discharged debtors of their obligations
upon surrender of their property.28 2 Likewise, in Green v. Biddle,283
the Supreme Court invalidated a Kentucky law that impaired the
ability of landowners to eject squatters.28 4
277. 15 U.S.C. § 777ppp(b) (1988).
278. Prior to the enactment of the Trust Indenture Act, majority action clauses
were common in English and Canadian indentures, but relatively rare in American in-
dentures. Francis L. Stetson, Preparation of Corporate Bonds, Mortgages, Collateral
Trusts and Debenture Indentures, in SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING,
REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 1, 68 (1927) (stating that "[t]he object of conferring
this power on the majority [in English indentures] is to protect it against unreasonable
conduct on the part of the minority and to prevent a defeat of a beneficial arrange-
ment because unanimity cannot be obtained." (footnote omitted)); De Forest Billyou,
Corporate Mortgage Bonds and Majority Clauses, 57 YALE L.J. 595, 595-97 (1948). The
reluctance to use majority action clauses in American indentures resulted primarily
from the uncertainty concerning the negotiability of bearer bonds with such clauses
under the laws of each of the 48 states--a concern that is not valid today. Id. at 597.
See also Howard J. Kashner, Majority Clauses and Non-Bankruptcy Corporate Reorga-
nizations-Contractual and Statutory Alternatives, 44 Bus. LAW. 123, 127-31 (Nov.
1988).
279. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
280. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-8, at 613 (2d. ed.
1988) (footnote omitted).
281. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
282. Id. at 207.
283. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1821).
284. Id. at 92.
Significantly, the contract impairment clause protects private con-
tracts against state, but not federal, action. 28 5 In Gi fillan v. Union
Canal Co.,286 the Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute
which provided that creditors who failed affirmatively to opt out of a
"an agreement of settlement" would have their secured and un-
secured debt converted into income bonds.287 In so doing, the
Supreme Court discussed the holdout problem in restructurings and
stated that the contract impairment clause serves only as a restriction
on state legislation.288
As in the present case, a very large majority of the bondholders sometimes
think it is for their own interest as well as that of their associates to surrender
a part of their rights and accept others instead, and they prepare and submit
for execution an agreement, the object of which is to carry their plan into ef-
fect. No majority, however large, can compel a minority, small though it be,
to enter into such an agreement against their will, and, under the Constitution
of the United States, it is probable that no statute of a State, passed after the
bonds were issued, subjecting the minority to the provisions of the agreement
without their consent, would be valid.
2 8 9
In a later case during the same term, the Supreme Court affirma-
tively stated that action by a governmental entity-such as a foreign
government or the federal government-that was not restricted by
the contract impairment clause could impair the obligations of the
contracts of minority holdouts in a nonbankruptcy debt reorganiza-
tion.290 In Canada Southern Railway v. Gebhard,291 the Supreme
Court upheld a reorganization plan under Canadian law that permit-
ted minority creditors to be bound by a plan approved by a specified
majority.292 After again discussing the problems created by minority
holdouts in a reorganization, the Supreme Court stated:
Hence it seems to be eminently proper that where the legislative power exists
some statutory provision should be made for binding the minority in a reason-
able way to the will of the majority; and unless, as is the case in the States of
the United States, the passage of laws impairing the obligation of contracts is
forbidden, we see no good reason why such provision may not be made in re-
spect to existing as well as prospective obligations. The nature of securities of
this class is such that the right of legislative supervision for the good of all,
unless restrained by some constitutional prohibition, seems almost necessarily
to form one of their ingredients, and when insolvency is threatened, and the
interests of the public, as well as creditors, are imperiled by the financial em-
barassments of the corporation, a reasonable "scheme of arrangement" may,
in our opinion, as well be legalized as an ordinary "composition in
bankruptcy." 2 9 3
The foregoing cases demonstrate that the contract impairment
285. GiZfillan v. Union Canal Co., 109 U.S. 401, 404 (1883).
286. 109 U.S. 401 (1883).
287. Id. at 407.
288. Id. at 404.
289. Id.
290. Canada S. Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 532, 535-36 (1883).
291. 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
292. Id. at 539.
293. Id. at 535.
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clause of the United States Constitution acts only as a limitation on
state legislation and state action. Thus, while the contract impair-
ment clause may serve as a restriction on the ability of a state court
to effectuate a reorganization through a mandatory class action
brought under state laws, it should not restrict the ability of a federal
court to effectuate a debt restructuring through a mandatory class ac-
tion under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Due Process Clause
While federal courts are not bound by the contract impairment
clause, they are bound by the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, which provides that no person shall be "deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law."294 In Gebhard, the
Supreme Court considered whether a "scheme of arrangment" under
Canadian law that bound nonassenting bondholders to an impair-
ment of their contract violated the due process clause.29 5 It stated:
The confirmation and legalization of a "scheme of arrangement" under such
circumstances is no more than is done in bankruptcy when a "composition"
agreement with the bankrupt debtor, if assented to by the required majority
of creditors, is made binding on the non-assenting minority. In no just sense
do such governmental regulations deprive a person of his property without
due process of law. They simply require each individual to so conduct himself
for the general good as not unnecessarily to injure another.29
In the context of a plan effectuated through settlement of a
mandatory class action lawsuit, the Supreme Court has imposed addi-
tional due process requirements. As discussed above, the Supreme
Court in Shutts held that due process requires the right to opt out in
certain class actions seeking money damages. 297 However, that hold-
ing specifically did not apply to class actions that primarily seek equi-
table relief, such as one effectuating a corporate reorganization.298
Since a class action lawsuit is, by definition, a representative action,
the due process clause requires that the representative of the class be
a person who will fairly insure the adequate representation of the
class.299 In Hansberry v. Lee,300 the Supreme Court held that parties
who were determined in a state court to be bound as members of a
"class" by a judgment rendered in an earlier class suit were not so
294. U.S. CONST. amend V.
295. Gebhard, 109 U.S. at 537.
296. Id
297. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812.
298. See supra Section III(G).
299. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940).
300. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
bound because the representatives of the class did not adequately
represent the members' interests. 30'
V. EXEMPT SETTLEMENT EXCHANGES UNDER SECTION 3(a)(10) OF
THE SECURITIES ACT
A. Background of Section 3(a)(10)
Securities distributed in connection with the settlement of litiga-
tion can often be issued without registration under the Securities Act
by relying on Section 3(a)(10) thereof, which provides an exemption,
among other things, for the issuance of securities whose term and
conditions have been approved by a court after a fairness hearing.3 0 2
The Section 3(a)(10) exemption represents a signficant departure
from the Security Act's "basic philosophy" of providing full and fair
disclosure in connection with the offer and sale of securities.30 3 The
"whole justification" for the Section 3(a)(10) exemption is that "the
examination and approval by the body in question of the fairness of
the issue in question is a substitute for the protection afforded to the
investor by the information which would otherwise be made available
to him through registration."3 0 4
The legislative history of Section 3(a)(10) indicates that its primary
purpose was to "offer financially troubled corporations an alternative
to the virtually impossible burdens of registration."3 0 5 The use of the
Section 3(a)(10) exemption for financial restructurings accomplished
301. Id. at 46.
302. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1988). Section 3(a)(10) exempts from the registration
provisions of the Securities Act the following:
Except with respect to a security exchanged in a case under title 11 [of the
United States Code], any security which is issued in exchange for one or more
bona fide outstanding securities, claims or property interests, or partly in such
exchange and partly for cash, where the terms and conditions of such issuance
and exchange are approved, after a hearing on the fairness of such terms and
conditions at which all persons to whom it is proposed to issue securities in
such exchange shall have the right to appear, by any court, or by any official
or agency of the United States, or by any State or Territorial banking or in-
surance commission or other governmental authority expressly authorized by
law to grant such approval.
Id.
303. 11 H. SOWARDS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIoNs, SECURITIES REGULATION, THE FED-
ERAL SECURITIES ACT AND THE TRUST INDENTURE ACT OF 1939, § 1.02, at 1-6.1 (1990).
304. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-312, 1 FED. SEC. L REP. (CCH) 2181, 2183
(March 15, 1935) (letter of SEC General Counsel). See also Memorandum of James M.
Landis to Senator D. Fletcher, Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 8669, at 8715 (1934) (stating that "[t]he entire
basis of the exemption of the second clause of section 4(3) [the predecessor to Section
3(a)(10)] rests upon the assumption that court supervision will be an adequate protec-
tion for investors in substitution for the registration requirements of the act.").
305. Barbara A. Ash, Reorganizations and Other Exchanges Under Section 3(a)(10)
of the Securities Act of 1933, 75 N.w. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1980) (footnote omitted). See also
7 J. HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, § 3.01[2], at
3-12 (1984) (noting that "the legislative history of Section 3(a)(10) indicates legislative
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through mandatory class action settlements is consistent with this
original legislative purpose.
B. Elements of the Section 3(a)(10) Exchange Exemption
Section 3(a)(10) specifies four basic requirements that must be met
to qualify for exemption from the registration requirements of the
Securities Act. These requirements include: (1) the issuance of a se-
curity; (2) an exchange for one or more bona fide outstanding securi-
ties, claims, or property interests; (3) a hearing on the fairness of the
terms and conditions of the exchange; and (4) court, agency, or offi-
cial approval.30 6
1. The Issuance of a Security
Section 3(a)(10) states that its provisions apply to the issuance of
"any security." 30 7 The SEC staff has interpreted this phrase literally
and shown a willingness to allow any instrument qualifying as a "se-
curity" under the definition in Section 2(1)308 to be issued in connec-
tion with a Section 3(a)(10) settlement exchange. For example, the
SEC has taken no-action positions with respect to Section 3(a)(10)
settlements involving the issuance of common stock,309 preferred
stock,310 corporate debt securities, 311 warrants to purchase stock,3 12
concern for only one type of transaction-the reorganization of a financially troubled
business.").
306. Ash, supra note 305, at 10-13 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1988)).
307. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1988).
308. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988).
309. See Riverbend International Corp., SEC No-Action Letter available in LEXIS,
Fedsec Library, Noact File (Mar. 30, 1990); Memory Metals, Inc., SEC No-Action Let-
ter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Dec. 9, 1988); Cavanagh Commu-
nities Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File
(July 22, 1987); Paradyne Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact
File (July 20, 1987); Ideal Basic Indus., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS,
Fedsec Library, Noact File (Jan. 30, 1987); Anacomp, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (July 24, 1985); Swanton Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Nov. 26, 1984)
(stock of third party); AES Technology Sys., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available in
LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (June 22, 1984); Allied Leisure Indus. Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Oct. 4, 1979); Sequoyah
Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File
(Sept. 6, 1973).
310. See Pacific Scientific Co., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec
Library, Noact File (July 31, 1989); Iomega Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, available in
LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Dec. 29, 1988) (stating that common stock was is-
suable upon conversion of preferred stock in reliance on Section 3(a)(9)); Endotronics,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Oct. 11,
1988) (distribution of third party stock); Northwest Indus.; Philadelphia and Reading
limited partnership interests or units,313 depositary receipts314 and
"put" rights.315 However, the Section 3(a)(10) exemption does not
cover securities issuable upon a subsequent conversion of securities
which were previously issued in a Section 3(a)(10) transaction316 or
securities issuable upon a subsequent exercise of warrants.317
2. An Exchange for One or More Bona Fide Outstanding
Securities, Claims, or Property Interests
Section 3(a)(10) provides that the exemption is applicable to the is-
suance of a security "in exchange for one or more bona fide outstand-
ing securities, claims or property interests, or partly in such exchange
and partly for cash."3 18 The flexibility provided by this broad lan-
guage is illustrated by comparing it to the much stricter require-
ments of the Section 3(a)(9) exemption.
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Aug.
10, 1973).
311. See Macleod-Stedman, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec
Library, Noact File (March 3, 1989) (old mortgage notes exchanged for new corporate
notes; redeemable, exchangeable preferred stock; and common stock); Mattel, Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Jan. 14, 1976)
(debentures).
312. Warrants: Dynamic Sciences Int'l, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available in
LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Dec. 30, 1988); Elscint Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter,
available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (May 13, 1988); Allied Leisure Indus.,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Oct. 4,
1979); Builders Inv. Group, SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Li-
brary, Noact File (Dec. 15, 1978), Standard Prudential Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Sept. 6, 1973); LIN Broadcasting
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Dec. 8,
1972).
313. Limited Partnership Units: RRP-DGT GP Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, avail-
able in LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact File (Sept. 25, 1989); C. Andrew Russell, MLP,
SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Aug. 24, 1989).
314. Gambro AB, SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library,
Noact File (Oct. 19, 1987).
315. Carolco Pictures, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Li-
brary, Noact File (Jan. 23, 1991).
316. See, e.g., Iomega Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Li-
brary, Noact File (Dec. 29, 1988) (common stock issuable upon conversion of such pre-
ferred stock cannot be issued under the Section 3(a)(10) exemption; Section 3(a)(9)
may be available).
317. See, e.g., Allied Leisure Indus., SEC No-Action Letter, LEXIS, Fedsec Library,
Noact File (Oct. 4, 1979) (warrants); Builder Inv. Group, SEC No-Action Letter,
LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (December 15, 1978) (stating that, with respect to
warrants, "the underlying shares must be registered absent the availability of Regula-
tion A or an applicable exemption."); LIN Broadcasting Co., SEC No-Action Letter,
available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (December 8, 1972) (stating that
"[r]egistration is mandatory if the warrants are to be converted into the underlying
stock of the company.").
318. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1988).
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a. No Same Issuer Requirement
Section 3(a)(9) exempts securities exchanged by the issuer with
"its" security holders.319 This means that the securities issued in the
exchange must be securities of the same entity that issued the securi-
ties sought in the exchange. 320 In the past, the SEC staff has con-
strued this requirement strictly.32 ' For example, the SEC has denied
no-action relief simply because an issuer changed its form of owner-
ship from a general partnership to a limited partnership,322 from a
corporation to a limited partnership,3 23from a corporation to a liqui-
dating trust3 24 or from a corporation to a liquidating partnership.325
Conversely, Section 3(a)(10) imposes no such requirement. First,
parties in a Section 3(a)(10) settlement exchange are not required to
tender securities at all: they may exchange any "claims, or property
interests."326 Second, the transferor of the securities need not be the
issuer of the securities: a settling defendant may use the Section
3(a)(10) exemption to distribute securities of another issuer.32 7
319. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1988).
320. Hendry County Bank, SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Li-
brary, Noact File) (May 28, 1982) (stating that Section 3(a)(9) is not available for a pro-
posed issuance of shares by a holding company to the shareholders of its subsidiary in
exchange for the stock of the subsidiary because the transaction involves securities of
two different issuers).
321. O'Neill Bondholders Comm., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fed-
sec Library, Noact File (July 10, 1974) (stating that issuer in an exchange transaction
must be the same entity which originally issued the securities to be surrendered).
322. NEOKA Group 1987-I, SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Li-
brary, Noact File (Jan. 19, 1990) (where no-action relief refused even though the
amendment of the partnership into a limited partnership did not cause a dissolution of
the partnership under state law or pursuant to the partnership agreement).
323. Kanawha Cauley Coal & Coke Co., SEC No-Action Letter, available in
LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Aug. 5, 1974); Recreation Ventures, SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Mar. 14, 1973).
324. Niagara Frontier Transit Sys., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available in
LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Dec. 11, 1974).
325. Mission Mart, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Li-
brary, Noact File (May 13, 1981).
326. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1988). See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 511 F.
Supp. 799 (D. Colo. 1981) (settlement agreement involving the issuance of common
stock and promissory notes to shareholders in exchange for a release of claims); Ideal
Basic Indus., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File
(Jan. 30, 1987) (common stock issued to plaintiffs in exchange for a release of claims
and covenant not to sue).
327. See, e.g., Endotronics, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec
Library, Noact File (Oct. 11, 1988) (where Hoechst Celanese Corp. distributed the com-
mon and preferred stock of Endotronics, Inc., in a Section 3(a)(10) settlement ex-
change); Swanton Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library,
Noact File (Nov. 26, 1984) (stock of Swanton Corp. issued by Swanton in exchange for
b. Partly for Cash
Section 3(a)(9) exempts securities issued by an issuer in exchange
with its security holders "exclusively,"3 28 which has been interpreted
not only to require that the exchange be exclusively with security
holders, but also that the transaction be exclusively an exchange
transaction-that is, security holders must not be required to contrib-
ute anything other than their securities. 329 This requirement permits
convertible securities to be converted pursuant to Section 3(a)(9),
since all that is being tendered is the security. However, that does
not generally permit warrants to be exercised, because to exercise
warrants a holder must pay a cash exercise price.330
On the other hand, Section 3(a)(10) provides that the securities
may be issued partly in exchange for an existing interest and partly
for cash.33 1 This feature permits a settling issuer to receive cash
from plaintiffs in connection with a settlement exchange. However,
there is little guidance concerning how substantial the cash portion
may be before the Section 3(a)(10) exemption is lost.332
c. Payment to Third Parties
Section 3(a)(9) requires that "no commission or other remunera-
tion is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting such ex-
change." 33 3 The restriction is not on solicitation in general, but
rather on payment of compensation for soliciting activities.
Section 3(a)(10) has no such restriction. The SEC staff has permit-
ted payments of cash and issuances of securities under the Section
3(a)(10) exemption to attorneys, expert witness and other profession-
als involved in the transaction.3 3 4 While the SEC staff has not specif-
the stock of Friendly Frost, Inc., to settle lawsuit by Friendly Frost stockholders over a
third-party exchange offer).
328. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1988).
329. See infra note 333 and accompanying text.
330. Landmark Oil & Gas, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec
Library, Noact File (Sept. 22, 1983) (stating that an exchange of new warrants for old
warrants is permitted under Section 3(a)(9), but the warrants may not be exercised un-
less the registration statement is effective, and a current prospectus is delivered); see
also Chemfix Technologies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec
Library, Noact File (Oct. 10, 1985).
331. 15 US.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1988).
332. 1 SECURrTIEs LAW TECHNIQUES § 6.02[1][d] (A. Sommer, Jr., ed. 1991). Clearly,
Section 3(a)(10) is inapplicable where only cash and no securities are tendered in an
exchange. S.E.C. v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 93,232 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); S.E.C. v. Philip S. Budin & Co., [1970-71 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 93,088 (D.N.J. 1971).
333. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1988).
334. See, e.g., Riverbend Int'l Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS,
Fedsec Library, Noact File (July 24, 1985) (allowing plaintiffs' counsel fees up to 331/3%
of shares distributed out of settlement fund, plus accrued interest on the value of the
shares); Elscint Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library,
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ically allowed such payments in connection with soliciting activities,
Section 3(a)(10) by its terms does not restrict such payments or
activities.
The thrust of the exchange requirement is that the securities be is-
sued to an existing security holder or other party with a valuable and
bona fide interest in the issuer; an anticipated claim or unrelated
property interest is not sufficient.335 Otherwise, a spurious exchange
could be used as a way to raise capital without registration. For ex-
ample, if a property interest or security to be exchanged is acquired
specifically for the purpose of effectuating an exchange, the proposed
exchange would not be considered bona fide.336
So long as the security, claim or interest to be exchanged is bona
fide, settling defendants have considerable flexibility in structuring
the terms of a settlement package. For example, the SEC staff has
approved settlement exchanges where plaintiffs are offered their
choice of securities or cash.3 37 In fact, the "size of the cash compo-
nent in the transferor's settlement package should be irrelevant for
purposes of the exemption."33 8
3. The Fairness Hearing
The key substantive requirement of Section 3(a)(10) is that "the
terms and conditions of such issuance and exchange are approved, af-
Noact File (July 24, 1985) (allowing plaintiff counsel's fees up to 25% of the cash to be
paid out of the cash settlement fund); Anacomp, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available
in LEXIS, Fedse Library, Noact File (July 24, 1985) (stating that plaintiff counsel's
fees to be paid out of cash settlement fund); AES Technology Sys., Inc., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (June 22, 1984) (where
plaintiffs' counsel to receive 12% of shares issued in settlement fund); Standard Pru-
dential Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File
(Aug. 17, 1973) (expert witnesses).
335. See, e.g., Cavanagh Communities Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, available in
LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (July 18, 1977) (stating that Section 3(a)(10) is not
available where the consideration exchanged is an unpaid future interest); Carex Int'l,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Oct. 20,
1975) (asserting that Section 3(a)(10) is not available where the interest exchanged is
credit for future rental payments).
336. See, e.g., Osias Org., Inc. SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec
Library, Noact File (Apr. 2, 1971) (stating that unregistered short-term receiver certifi-
cates issued for cash under Section 3(a)(7) may not be subsequently exchanged for
common stock and convertible debentures under Section 3(a)(10)).
337. See, e.g., Iomega Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Li-
brary, Noact File (Dec. 29, 1988) (stating that plaintiffs have the option to take pre-
ferred stock or cash); Elgin Nat'l Indus., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS,
Fedsec Library, Noact File (May 9, 1975).
338. 7 J. WILLIAM HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF
1933 § 3.02[2][b], at 3-17 (1984).
ter a hearing upon the fairness of such terms and condition, at which
all persons to whom it is proposed to issue securities in such ex-
change shall have the right to appear, by any court .... -339
a. Notice
Since any resolution of a class action lawsuit affects the rights and
claims of all members of the class, the SEC has stressed the impor-
tance of providing proper notice to class members of the hearing to
approve the transactions. 34 0  This is the case even though Rule
23(c)(2) does not require notice to class members in certain
mandatory class actions.3 41 In a number of instances, the SEC has
conditioned its Section 3(a)(10) no-action positions upon the require-
ment that "all persons to whom stock is to be issued receive notifica-
tion of the hearing and of entitlement to be heard."342 In the case of
security holders, this requirement is satisfied when notice is mailed
to all registered "and known beneficial holders" detailing the time
and place of the hearing with a summary of the proposed settle-
ment. 343 In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Blinder Robin-
son & Co.,344 which involved the issuance of securities under Section
3(a)(10) in connection with the settlement of an SEC enforcement ac-
tion, the court described the mailed notice thus:
After preliminary approval of the settlement, a hearing was set to consider
the fairness of the agreement and notice of that hearing was mailed to all per-
sons to whom the settling parties proposed to issue securities. That notice in-
cluded a summary of the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement
and invited the appearance at the hearing by all affected persons, with or
without counsel, and also provided for the submission of written objections
prior to the hearing.3 4 5
339. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1988).
340. See infra notes 342-43 and accompanying text.
341. See FED. R. Civ. PROC. R. 23(c)(2) (mandating notice in Rule 23(b)(3) actions
only).
342. See, e.g., Cavanagh Communities Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, available in
LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (July 22, 1987); Cavanagh Communities Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Mar. 4, 1985).
343. Macleod-Stedman, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Li-
brary, Noact File (Mar. 3, 1989).
344. 511 F. Supp. 799 (1981).
345. Id at 800. See also Securities Act Release No. 33,312, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
2181, at 2590 (Mar. 15, 1935) (stating that "[a]lthough the wording of section 3(a)(10)
does not demand such notice, in my opinion this requirement is to be implied .....
Professor Hicks has written:
[A]t a minimum, the notice should clearly advise the prospective recipients of
the nature of the pending action, the terms of the settlement (including the
fact that unregistered securities will be issued), the location of more detailed
information about the litigation and settlement that is available for inspection,
the date, time, and place of the fairness hearing, and the fact that they have a
right to appear and object.
7 J. WILLIAM HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933,
§ 3.02 [4][b], at 3-37 (1984).
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As noted above, under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, a dismissal or compromise of a class action may not occur
without court approval, which must be preceded by notice to inter-
ested parties "in such manner as the court directs."346 Even though
this notice procedure is less defined than under Section 3(a)(10), the
SEC has acknowledged that a notice procedure which satisfies Rule
23(e) is sufficient for the Section 3(a)(10) exemption.3 47
Because holders of registered securities, unlike certain classes of
plaintiffs, are relatively easy to identify and locate, an issuer propos-
ing a class action settlement should have little difficulty providing
notice that satisfies the requirements of Section 3(a)(10).
b. Hearing and Approval
While Rule 23(e) does not specifically require that a hearing occur
in connection with the dismissal or compromise of a class action law-
suit, it is clear under Section 3(a)(10) that a fairness hearing must be
held in order to satisfy the requirements for the exemption.348 In
Blinder Robinson, the court noted that "[t]here is no statutory defini-
tion of 'fairness' as used in section 3(a)(10) and there is no general
guidance suggesting the criteria for the court to consider in determin-
ing the question of approval." 349 In that case, the court determined
the fairness issue by focusing upon the procedural aspects of the set-
tlement.350 According to the court, the key factors were:
(1) the recommendations of counsel; (2) the scope of the discovery record as
an indicator of the adequacy of the investigation into the facts; (3) the appar-
ent alternatives to the settlement; (4) the nature and volume of responses
from those receiving notice of the hearing, and (5) the opportunity for direct
participation in the process of obtaining full disclosure. 35 1
After analyzing these factors and concluding that they had been
satisfied, the court stated:
Those receiving the offer under the terms of the settlement agreement have
had a full and fair opportunity to learn everything required to make their de-
cision. Accordingly, it must be concluded that they will act in awareness of
the risks involved in acceptance and the alternatives attendant upon a deci-
sion to decline the offer. Nothing more could be accomplished by registration
and nothing more is required in the determination that this settlement should
346. FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 23(e).
347. Mackey Int'l, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library,
Noact File (Feb. 25, 1974).
348. Compare FED. R. CIv. PRoc. 23(e) with 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1988).
349. Blinder Robinson, 511 F. Supp. at 801.
350. Id. at 801.
351. Id.
be approved. 3 5 2
The Blinder Robinson approach, which seeks to assure procedural
fairness and adequate disclosure and relies upon fully informed par-
ties to arrive at a fair settlement, has been criticized as overly pas-
sive. Professor Hicks stated that "it is reasonable for a claimant to
assume that judicial approval of an offer of settlement carries with it
a judgment that the court has found the value of the securities of-
fered to be roughly equivalent to the value of the claim of loss."35 3
The court in Continental Assurance3s4 referred to this criticism and
stated that this "reading seems more consistent with the plain lan-
guage of the statute and its purposes." 355
To be fair, however, the Blinder Robinson court distinguished the
case before it, which was an SEC enforcement action, from a class ac-
tion by pointing to the fact that "the SEC is not here as the represen-
tative of a class of investors claiming relief."3 56  The Blinder
Robinson court suggested that in a class action it would be con-
fronted with "measuring the adequacy of the relief obtained by com-
paring the value of the securities to be issued with the claims of loss
... 357
A review of the cases which discuss the factors to be considered in
determing fairness in the context of a Section 3(a)(10) settlement ex-
change indicates that the articulated factors are substantively identi-
cal to the determination that a class action settlement is fair,
adequate and reasonable. Additionally, one commentator has sug-
gested that, at least where Section 3(a)(10) is used in the settlement
of litigation, courts should follow the fairness standard used in class
action settlements by giving approval to the exchange transaction if
the "settlement... offered is 'fair,' 'reasonable,' and 'adequate.' "358
While the SEC has not attempted to define what a fairness deter-
mination entails in the context of a Section 3(a)(10) determination, it
has required that courts making such determinations be advised of
the consequences.3 5 9 Furthermore, the SEC's no-action letters pro-
352. Id. at 802.
353. 7 J. HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933,
§ 3.02[4][c], at 3-46.7 (1984).
354. 694 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
355. Id. at 468.
356. Blinder Robinson, 511 F. Supp. at 801.
357. Id.
358. J. HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
§ 3.02[21[a] n.5 (rev. ed. 1981). For a discussion of the fairness standard used to evalu-
ate class action settlements, see supra Section III(H)(4).
359. See, e.g., Cavanagh Communities Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, available in
LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (July 22, 1987) (where a no-action position was con-
ditioned upon the court being advised "prior to the hearing that if the terms and condi-
tions of the transaction are approved, registration of the securities issued by the
Company would not be required under the 1933 Act by virtue of the Court's ap-
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vide useful guidance regarding the definition of the term "fairness."
For example, in Churubusco Bancorp,360 the staff upheld the use of a
"not unfair and unreasonable to . .. shareholders" standard of re-
view by the Indiana Department of Financial Institutions. 36 1
4. Court, Agency, or Official Approval
The final requirement for perfection of the Section 3(a)(10) exemp-
tion is the approval of the transaction or settlement "by any court, or
by any official or agency of the United States, or by any State or Ter-
ritorial banking or insurance commission or other governmental au-
thority expressly authorized by law to grant such approval." 36 2 The
SEC staff has interpreted the term "any court" quite liberally to in-
clude any federal363 or state364 court, unless jurisdiction is clearly
lacking.365
C. Use of Section 3(a)(10) in Conjunction with Class Action
Settlements
Section 3(a)(10) is often used to accomplish an exchange pursuant
to the settlement of litigation.366 Further,
[n]o-action letters indicate that section 3(a)(10) is quite often useful to the set-
tlement of litigation arising from... various . . . insolvency-related issuances
of securities not pursuant to the Federal Bankruptcy Act .... [T]here appears
to be no limitation, even in the Commission's view, on the availability of the
Exchange Exemption because of the nature of the litigation proposed to be
settled.36 7
Hence, Section 3(a)(10) should be a viable exemption to pursue
when settling with a group of bondholders who sue a corporation be-
cause of its default on a class of bonds or because they oppose a pro-
posed corporate debt restructuring.
proval.") Accord RRP DGT GP Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS,
Fedsec Library, Noact File) (Sept. 25, 1989).
360. SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (Jan.
13, 1984).
361. Id.
362. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1988).
363. See, e.g., Geotek Resources Fund, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available in
LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File) (May 5, 1982).
364. See, e.g., Benson Mines, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, available in LEXIS, Fed-
sec Library, Noact File) (June 29, 1979).
365. See O'Neill Bondholders Comm., SEC No-Action Letter [1974-75 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,947, at 84,438 (July 10, 1974) (asserting that a
bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to pass upon a Section 3(a)(10) transaction).
366. Ash, supra note 305, at 37.
367. Id. at 39.
VI. QUALIFICATION OF NEW INDENTURES UNDER THE TRUST
INDENTURE ACT
Section 304(a)(4)(A) of the Trust Indenture Act exempts from the
Trust Indenture Act any security exempted under Section 3(a) of the
Securities Act, except for securities exempted under Sections 3(a)(9)
or 3(a)(10) thereof.36s Accordingly, if debt securities are to be issued
in a Section 3(a)(10) settlement exchange, the indenture under which
such securities will be issued must be qualified under the Trust In-
denture Act.
Section 307 of the Trust Indenture Act governs the qualification of
indentures covering securities not required to be registered under the
Securities Act.369 Form T-3 is the appropriate form for qualification
of indentures governing securities not required to be registered.3 70 In
addition, the indenture trustee must file a statement of eligibility
qualification on Form T-1.371 Form T-3 application must be filed in
time to have the indenture qualified prior to the issuance of the debt
securities in the settlement. Unless a delaying amendment is filed,
the T-3 becomes effective on the 20th day (including Saturdays, Sun-
days and holidays) after the date of filing.372
VII. CONCLUSION
Mandatory class action lawsuits brought by bondholders to initiate
corporate restructurings have a number of advantages over prepack-
aged plans and other restructuring techniques. Among other things,
the mandatory class action technique permits bondholders to con-
summate a consensual restructuring that is binding upon minority
holdouts without the need to resort to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code and without the need for registration with the SEC. Although
this technique has been used only rarely and has received little atten-
tion, its merits should command greater attention in the future.
368. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 304(a)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(a)(4)(A) (1988).
369. See Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 77ggg (1988).
370. 17 C.F.R. § 260.7a-1 (1991).
371. Id. § 260.5a-1.
372. Id. § 260.7a-9.
